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I.   INTRODUCTION
In the past two decades, the use of mediation1 in legal disputes
has increased dramatically.2 State legislatures have enacted statutes
                                                                                                                   
* Assistant Professor, Department of Dispute Resolution, Nova Southeastern Uni-
versity. A.B., University of Michigan, 1974; Ph.D., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1995;
J.D., Hastings College of Law, 1980. I am enormously grateful to Bob Barrett, Jim
Boskey, Baruch Bush, Aimee Delman, Greg Firestone, Janice Fleischer, Bill Howard, Jon
Hyman, Ron Kelly, Lela Love, Mike Lowy, David Matz, Bobbi McAdoo, Craig McEwen,
Rick Reed, Len Riskin, Nancy Rogers, Jean Sternlight, Fran Tetunic, Bill Warters, and
Archie Zariski for their encouragement and very helpful comments, and to Aimee Delman
for her diligent research assistance. I dedicate this Article to Marc Galanter, who has been
a kind mentor and has provided a wonderful model of scholarship. Of course, I take re-
sponsibility for what follows, so don’t blame these good people.
1. In general, mediation is a procedure in which the mediator tries to help disputing
parties reach agreement and in which the mediator has little or no authority to impose a
decision if the parties do not reach agreement. See CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE
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authorizing, and in some cases mandating, courts to order cases to
mediation.3 In some areas, the use of mediation in litigation is so
routine and accepted that lawyers4 do not wait to be ordered into
mediation, but initiate mediation themselves.5 Indeed, in some
places, mediation has become so much a part of the litigation process
that lawyers may refrain from direct, unmediated negotiations, an-
ticipating that they will conduct their negotiations in mediation.6 As
                                                                                                                   
MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT 8, 41-53 (2d ed.
1996). Practitioners and empirical researchers differ about many characteristics claimed
to be essential to mediation, such as the goals of the mediation. See infra Part II.B. The
definition in this footnote represents minimal characteristics that I believe most knowl-
edgeable observers would accept.
2. Good data on use of mediation is hard to come by. Unlike the courts, where there
is a clerk’s office through which all lawsuits must flow, there is no central registry of me-
diation cases. Indeed, even in states like Florida, where there is a well-organized state-
wide system for providing mediation, it is impossible to get a full and accurate count. In
Florida, at least 76,920 mediations were conducted in 1995. See SARAH SCHULTZ ET AL.,
FLORIDA MEDIATION/ARBITRATION PROGRAMS: A COMPENDIUM 26, 52, 79, 102 (9th ed.
1996). This figure understates the actual number of cases because data was not available
from courts without coordinators of mediation services. See id. at v; see also Sharon Press,
Institutionalization: Savior or Saboteur of Mediation?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 903, 907
n.18 (1997).
The RAND Corporation made perhaps the best effort to count private alternative dis-
pute resolution (ADR) cases by surveying ADR providers in Los Angeles about caseloads
during the period of 1988-93. See ELIZABETH ROLPH ET AL., INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE,
ESCAPING THE COURTHOUSE: PRIVATE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN LOS ANGELES
18, 19 (1994). The RAND researchers found that the annual rate of growth of caseloads
increased dramatically during this period, from about 15% in 1989 to 90% in 1993. See id.
at 19 fig.3.1. Because some providers in the earlier years were not available to respond to
the study, the figures for the earlier years actually understate the rate of growth. See id.
at 19 n.3. In 1993, there were at least 23,672 private ADR cases in Los Angeles (including
procedures other than mediation). See id. at 18 tbl.3.1.
3. See NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. MCEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE
app. B (2d ed. 1994 & Supp. 1996) (providing a state-by-state listing of significant media-
tion legislation). Although many points in this Article would apply to ADR procedures
generally, this Article focuses on mediation because it is the quintessential third-party
procedure for eliciting agreement and because of its widespread and generic applicability.
4. To avoid confusion, this Article uses the word “lawyers” to refer to lawyers only
when they act as representatives. The word “mediators” refers to people who act as third
parties assisting in negotiation, regardless of the mediators’ profession of origin. This dis-
tinction is important because many lawyers act as mediators as part of their practices.
The term “lawyer-mediator” is reserved for lawyers when they are acting as mediators.
5. In Florida, the courts may order cases to mediation. See FLA R. CIV. P. 1.700(a).
Within 10 days after a court-ordered referral to mediation, the parties may select their
own mediator. See FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.720(f). The Florida Dispute Resolution Center reports
that more than 90% of parties ordered to mediation agree on a mediator rather than hav-
ing one assigned by the court. See SCHULTZ ET AL., supra note 2, at v. There are no statis-
tics describing the number of cases in Florida in which the participants choose mediation
without first having been ordered to mediation. See Interview with Sharon Press, Direc-
tor, Fla. Disp. Resol. Ctr., in Fort Lauderdale, Fla. (Oct. 10, 1996).
6.  See Barbara McAdoo & Nancy Welsh, The Times They Are a Changin’—Or Are
They? An Update on Rule 114, HENNEPIN LAW., July-Aug. 1996, at 8, 10. In Hennepin
County, Minnesota, lawyers view Minnesota Supreme Court Rule 114 as mandating use of
ADR, usually mediation. A preliminary study based on 12 in-depth interviews with Hen-
nepin County lawyers found that as a result of Rule 114, “[t]here may be less lawyer-to-
lawyer negotiation” as lawyers prefer to “wait for a ‘mandatory’ mediator’s assistance with
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court planners perceive growth in the volume and complexity of their
caseloads and that their resources do not keep pace with that
growth, it seems likely that many courts will find it increasingly at-
tractive to order large numbers of cases to mediation.7 Where media-
tion becomes routinely integrated into litigation practice, we can ex-
pect that this will significantly alter both lawyers’ practices in legal
representation and mediators’ practices in offering and providing
mediation services. I describe this new dispute resolution environ-
ment as a “liti-mediation” culture, in which it becomes taken for
granted that mediation is the normal way to end litigation.8
This Article sketches out some aspects of both lawyering and me-
diation practice that may be affected by development of a liti-
mediation culture. Part II examines the growth of the private mar-
ket for mediation and an accompanying specialization of mediation
practice. These changes seem likely to require mediators to develop
market niches with identifiable characteristics of their mediation
practices. Simultaneously, lawyers, as regular buyers of mediation
services, will be expected to recognize and make decisions based on
significant distinctions between mediation providers. Part II de-
scribes some of these distinctions that may evolve in the mediation
market, particularly focusing on differences in various mediation
goals and styles. The institutionalization of a liti-mediation culture
                                                                                                                   
settlement.” Id. at 10; see also Press, supra note 2, at 908 (noting that Florida lawyers are
increasingly requesting mediation without waiting to be ordered to mediate).
7. See Jay Folberg et al., Use of ADR in California Courts: Findings & Proposals, 26
U.S.F. L. REV. 343, 346, 409-10 (1992). Finding that California courts are now faced with a
greater number of cases and more complex cases than ever before, the authors made rec-
ommendations that included the development of an “ADR track” for some cases. Id. at
397; see also id. at 409-10.
8. See infra Part II.A. Mike Bridenback, the first director of the Dispute Resolution
Center and current trial court administrator for Florida’s Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, em-
phasized this view: “Mediation, in just ten short years, is not an alternative but the pri-
mary system of justice in Florida’s civil and family courts.” Announcement for the Florida
Dispute Resolution Center’s Annual Conference for Mediators & Arbitrators (1996) (on file
with author). Liti-mediation culture is likely to vary in different communities. See infra
note 23 and accompanying text. Thus, references to liti-mediation cultures refer to the
various situations in different areas rather than a single, homogeneous, national liti-
mediation culture. For example, my research suggests that different states have stronger
and weaker “mediation cultures.” I asked six experts on dispute resolution to rate the
strength of the ADR cultures of 19 states and found that their ratings were highly corre-
lated with each other and with the existence of certain types of statutes. See John Lande,
The Diffusion of a Process Pluralist Ideology of Disputing: Factors Affecting Opinions of
Business Lawyers and Executives 48-53 (1995) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univer-
sity of Wisconsin (Madison)) (on file with author). A survey of business lawyers and execu-
tives in several states revealed that there was greater support for use of mediation in
Florida (identified by the experts as a strong ADR-culture state) than in Tennessee and
Pennsylvania (identified as weak ADR-culture states). There were no comparable differ-
ences in support for arbitration, suggesting that these attitudes related more specifically
to mediation than ADR generally. See id. at 177-83, 197-201. Although this suggests that
there is significant variation between states, there is obviously considerable variation
within states as well.
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is likely to generate generally accepted vocabularies that reflect and
reinforce such differences within local mediation markets. Part II
speculates about the language that will be used to portray varied
species of mediation in a liti-mediation world. Although proponents
of competing mediation philosophies understandably seek to define
the language and practice of mediation in their own terms, I advo-
cate for pluralist local mediation cultures in which differences are
clearly identified, respected, and valued.
Part III focuses on an important distinction between mediation
practices. Much of the current ferment in the mediation field deals
with a distinction between “facilitative” and “evaluative” approaches
to mediation.9 A related distinction is between “empowerment” (or
“transformative”) and “settlement” approaches.10 In Part III, I main-
tain that the essence of facilitative and empowerment approaches is
a high priority devoted to promoting the principals’11 exercise of their
                                                                                                                   
9. See Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators’ Orientations, Strategies, and
Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 7 (1996). Professor
Riskin’s framework has attracted a good deal of attention. Teachers and trainers have in-
corporated his framework into their presentations, and practitioners have used it to ex-
plain their version of mediation to potential clients. See id. at 49 n.125. At the 1996 An-
nual Conference for Mediators and Arbitrators, sponsored by the Florida Dispute Resolu-
tion Center, a major plenary session was entitled “Evaluative v. Facilitative Mediation:
Current Ethical and Policy Considerations.” See James J. Alfini, Moderator, Evaluative
Versus Facilitative Mediation: A Discussion, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 919 (1997). Similarly,
in September 1996, the Association of Broward County (Florida) Mediators sponsored a
program entitled, “A Great Debate: Facilitative v. Evaluative Mediation,” featuring Mel
Rubin and Arthur “Jim” Parkhurst. Professors Barbara McAdoo and Jeffrey Krivis are
now developing a self-assessment questionnaire for mediators to identify their orientation
within Riskin’s framework. See Barbara McAdoo & Jeffrey Krivis, Mediator Classification
Index (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). For a critique of Riskin’s frame-
work, see Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, “Evaluative” Mediation Is an Oxymoron,
14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 31, 32 (1996), and for a response, see John Bicker-
man, Evaluative Mediator Responds, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 70 (1996). For
a collection of sources on this topic, see Jeffrey W. Stempel, Beyond Formalism and False
Dichotomies: The Need for Institutionalizing a Flexible Concept of the Mediator’s Role, 24
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 949, 953 n.7 (1997).
10. The clearest and strongest expression of the empowerment ideal is in ROBERT A.
BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO
CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION (1994). The Bush and Folger model
of transformation was the focus of a lively discussion at a session of the ADR Section at
the 1996 Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools (Models of Media-
tion, Jan. 7, 1996). The subject of transformation was also highlighted at a popular session
at the 1996 Annual Meeting of the Society for Professionals in Dispute Resolution enti-
tled, “Transformation of What? The Meaning of Conflict Transformation” (Oct. 24, 1996).
For two critical reviews of The Promise of Mediation, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The
Many Ways of Mediation: The Transformation of Traditions, Ideologies, Paradigms, and
Practices, 11 NEGOTIATION J. 217, 235-39 (1995), and James Boskey, Books in Review,
ALTERNATIVE NEWSL., March 1995, at 22-23. For a detailed discussion of issues of
empowerment, see infra Parts III.A and III.C.
11. In keeping with the emphasis on promotion of responsibility by the parties in a
conflict who have retained lawyers and/or mediators, the parties are generally referred to
as the “principals” because “clients” has a connotation of dependence on and deference to
others’ judgments. Although parties are not principals of mediators in the sense of a legal
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decisionmaking responsibility by eliciting what I refer to as “high-
quality consent” to their agreements.12 Part III analyzes how the
concept of “empowerment” has been used and contrasts it with the
minimal standards of consent required to create a legally enforceable
agreement. Rather than achieving the minimal standards needed to
settle a dispute, proponents of empowerment aspire to help princi-
pals achieve a higher standard of consent, what I call “high-quality
consent.” As this can be confusing to apply in practice, Part III iden-
tifies a set of concrete mediation tactics that may promote—and be
indicators of—this approach. These tactics include: (1) explicit con-
sideration of the principals’ goals and interests, (2) explicit identifi-
cation of plausible options for satisfying these interests, (3) the prin-
cipals’ explicit choice of options for consideration, (4) careful consid-
eration of these options, (5) mediators’ restraint in pressuring prin-
cipals to accept particular options, (6) limitation on use of time pres-
sure, and (7) confirmation of the principals’ consent to selected op-
tions. This set of tactics is offered as a cluster of factors that might
be used to create a continuum of the quality of consent and not as
absolute or necessary requirements. Although these tactics for elic-
iting high-quality consent may not be the norm in practice,13 even by
practitioners who subscribe to this philosophy, they reflect the ideal
to which much mediation theory aspires.14 Part III asserts that this
                                                                                                                   
principal-agent relationship, the term is used in the sense of the parties being the princi-
pal decisionmakers. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1192 (6th ed. 1990) (defining the adjec-
tive “principal” as meaning “[c]hief; leading; most important or considerable; primary;
original” and “[h]ighest in rank, authority, character, importance, or degree”); see also in-
fra Parts III.A, III.C; cf. Stempel, supra note 9, at 965-66 n.53 (criticizing reference to dis-
puting parties as mediator’s “clients” or “principals”). I am grateful to Berkeley, Califor-
nia, mediator Ron Kelly for suggesting use of the term “principal.” For convenience, I use
the term “participants” to collectively refer to the principals and their lawyers in media-
tion, but not the mediator.
12. The notion of evaluating dispute resolution by standards of quality is not original
to me. Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow, in particular, has made this a central theme in
her work. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philo-
sophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663 (1995)
[hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?]; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pur-
suing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted or “The Law of
ADR”, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1991) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement
in an Adversary Culture]; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and
Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485 (1985); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem
Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View
of Legal Negotiation]; see also generally Symposium, Quality of Dispute Resolution, 66
DENV. U. L. REV. 335 (1989).
13. See Deborah M. Kolb & Kenneth Kressel, Conclusion: The Realities of Making
Talk Work, in WHEN TALK WORKS: PROFILES OF MEDIATORS 459, 459-60 (Deborah M. Kolb
ed., 1994).
14. See generally BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 10; ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO
YES (2d ed. 1991); MOORE, supra note 1; Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?,
supra note 12.
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standard for evaluating mediation processes is important for two rea-
sons. First, this dimension may be an important distinguishing fea-
ture of mediation practices in the mediation marketplace described in
Part II. Second, it is an important variable of mediation that is likely
to be affected by the participation of lawyers as described in Part IV.
Part IV considers how the routine incorporation of mediation in
litigation may affect both processes. This Part analyzes these possi-
bilities by examining how the active participation of lawyers in me-
diation may alter the constellation of relationships of professionals
and clients in a legal case. Regular participation of lawyers in me-
diation is likely to result in ongoing relationships between mediators
and lawyers that may overshadow their respective relationships
with the principals and dramatically affect the mediation process. As
a result of the prominent role of lawyers in mediation, mediators
may feel especially obliged to cater to the lawyers’ interests, which
often entails pressing the principals into settlement. The participa-
tion of lawyers may increase time pressure in mediation, putting ad-
ditional pressure on principals. Moreover, extending lawyers’ norms
of adversarial bargaining and “client control” further adds to the pres-
sure, all of which may undermine the quality of principals’ consent.
Part V integrates the analysis of how the dynamics of liti-
mediation culture may affect both lawyering and mediation prac-
tices. In Parts V and VI, I contend that the possible changes in law-
yering and mediation practices outlined in this Article are contingent
upon the values, attitudes, and decisions of a wide range of actors, in-
cluding mediators, lawyers, law school faculty, legislators, judges,
court administrators, and the general public. I suggest that we are
now in a critical period regarding these changes because they are
likely to crystallize for an extended time—albeit with significant local
variations—after the current period of institutionalization.15 I con-
clude with suggestions for developing the mediation field in the future.
II.   THE GROWING AND INCREASINGLY SPECIALIZED MARKET FOR
MEDIATION SERVICES
As the private market for mediation has grown, there has been an
accompanying specialization of mediation practices. Mediators vary
                                                                                                                   
15. Institutionalization processes have been analyzed in a variety of disciplines and
using a variety of definitions. Though popular conceptions often focus on institutions as
organizational structures, most scholarly analyses are much broader and include gener-
ally recognized norms, roles, and conventions. Thus, institutions may range “from hand-
shakes to marriages to strategic-planning departments” and may cover “a wide territorial
range, from understandings within a single family to myths of rationality and progress in
the world system.” Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, Introduction to THE NEW
INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 1, 7-9 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. Di-
Maggio eds., 1991). For an analysis of the institutionalization of ADR in the United States
in recent decades, see Lande, supra note 8.
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greatly in their training and experience, areas of expertise, and
styles and techniques, among other characteristics. For mediators
and buyers of their services (often lawyers) to make the mediation
market operate effectively, it is becoming increasingly important for
the buyers and sellers to accurately identify relevant distinctions be-
tween mediators. Part II.A provides an overview of how mediation
buyers may go about shopping for a mediator in a liti-mediation cul-
ture typified by a large pool of increasingly specialized mediators.
Part II.B describes two important dimensions that may differentiate
mediators: their primary goals and techniques. Part II.C analyzes a
controversy within the mediation field over what philosophies and
styles may be appropriately called “mediation.” Contrasting what I
describe as a “single-school” position, which favors a relatively nar-
row and pure definition of mediation, I advocate a “pluralist” view
that accepts the legitimacy of a broad range of mediation practices as
long as they are clearly described to prospective mediation buyers.
A.   Shopping for Mediators in a Liti-Mediation Culture
There was a time not long ago in the modern ADR era16 when the
use of mediation in legal cases was extremely rare. It was so rare
that some early mediating practitioners themselves did not have a
name for the procedure.17 In a relatively short time, mediation has
become so widely accepted that it is now enshrined in many stat-
utes18 and generally viewed positively by lawyers,19 who are espe-
cially important actors in our adversarial legal system.20 Indeed,
even though some statutes only authorize, but do not mandate, use
                                                                                                                   
16. Professor Jeffrey Stempel suggests that the 1976 Pound Conference is an appro-
priate point to mark the beginning of the modern ADR movement. Stempel argues that
“new ADR” is more likely than “old ADR” to involve, among other things, mass-produced
procedures affecting large classes of persons or entities. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflec-
tions on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed
Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 297, 309-24, 334-40
(1996).
17. For example, when Henry Elson began mediating in 1971, he referred to his work
as “nonadversarial law practice.” Henry M. Elson, Divorce Mediation in a Law Office Set-
ting, in DIVORCE MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 143, 143-44 (Jay Folberg & Ann
Milne eds., 1988).
18. See ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 3, apps. A-C (providing a comprehensive
summary of mediation legislation).
19. See, e.g., Lande, supra note 8, at 133-76; Morris L. Medley & James A. Schellen-
berg, Attitudes of Attorneys Toward Mediation, 12 MEDIATION Q. 185, 189-92 (1994);
DELOITTE & TOUCHE LITIG. SERVS., 1993 SURVEY OF GENERAL AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL 10-
15 (1993); see also Folberg et al., supra note 7, at 365 (finding that judges familiar with
ADR had high praise for ADR processes, especially mediation).
20. See Robert Kagan, Do Lawyers Cause Adversarial Legalism? A Preliminary In-
quiry, 19 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1 passim (1994) (observing that the U.S. legal system relies
on litigant activism in which investigation and presentation of claims is based on initia-
tive of disputing parties acting primarily through lawyers).
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of mediation, some courts routinely order most cases on their dockets
to mediation.21 In areas where mediation has become a regular part
of the litigation process, key actors in the legal system (such as
judges, court administrators, and lawyers) may take it for granted
that settlement negotiations will primarily take place in mediation.
Shifting from a predominant culture of “litigotiation” that Professor
Marc Galanter described a decade ago,22 we may be developing what
might be called “liti-mediation” cultures in some areas where it has
become taken for granted that mediation is the normal way of ending
litigation.23
In recent years, liti-mediation culture has expanded from what
some might consider the isolated “backwaters” of low-status cases in
areas like family law and small-claims court into the “heartland” of
litigation,24 including legal disputes of virtually every kind. Thus, a
well-developed liti-mediation culture requires a market with both a
substantial variety and volume of mediators to provide a range of ac-
ceptable mediation services. Full-fledged liti-mediation cultures are
especially likely to develop in larger urban areas where there are
greater caseload pressures and difficulties in reaching resolution be-
cause of more tenuous relationships between lawyers and the clients
themselves.25 Under these conditions, the pool of mediators is likely
                                                                                                                   
21. See McAdoo and Welsh, supra note 6, at 10.
22. Galanter used the term “litigotiation” to refer to the strategic pursuit of settle-
ment through mobilizing the court process. Thus, lawyers, and to some extent principals,
pursue litigation with the private expectation of ultimately reaching settlement, but use
the litigation process to gain strategic advantage in negotiation. See Marc Galanter,
Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation to Teach About Legal Process, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 268,
268 (1984).
23. As with litigotiation, in a “liti-mediation” culture, the initiation and conduct of
litigation are oriented to obtaining favorable settlements, usually defined in adversarial
terms. The two regimes differ in the cultural stories and practices typical of bilateral and
mediated negotiations. For example, in typical litigotiation culture, lawyers work to create
strong cases for trial and then engage in a ritual pretense of being reluctant to negotiate
out of fear of losing advantage by appearing weak. While liti-mediation culture may not
differ radically from that typical of litigotiation, there are certainly some differences. The
existence of a formal and (quasi-) mandatory mediation procedure probably provides
greater legitimacy of resolution through settlement. Moreover, mediation, especially with
directive techniques, see infra note 40, provides a generally accepted mechanism for law-
yers to settle while maintaining the appearance of strength for the “benefit” of clients and
opposing parties alike. See Craig A. McEwen et al., Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the
Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1317,
1369-70 (1995). As one reviewer suggested, lawyers may take strong positions for a vari-
ety of reasons, including protecting the clients’ interests and solving the lawyers’ problems
in managing relationships with their clients, or some combination.
24. I am grateful to Marc Galanter for suggesting the concept of the “heartland” of
litigation.
25. For an excellent analysis of these and other factors leading to increased litiga-
tion, see MARC GALANTER & JOEL ROGERS, A TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN BUSINESS
DISPUTING? SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 41-47 (Inst. for Legal Stud., Disp. Proc-
essing Res. Program Working Paper No. 10-3, 1991).
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to be relatively large26 and characterized by relatively distant and
professional (rather than close and personal) relationships with the
various actors in a case.
In this market, both buyers and sellers of mediation services need
to identify and distinguish differences between mediators. This is an
important concern for both the buyers and sellers. For the sellers
(i.e., the mediators and mediation businesses), regularly attracting
new clients is obviously necessary to stay in business and prosper.
Thus, it is not surprising that workshops on marketing techniques
are perennial favorites at conferences for mediation practitioners.27
In a large, diverse, and somewhat impersonal28 market of mediation
services, buying those services considered appropriate for particular
cases is an important and difficult task, which is often performed by
the principals’ lawyers.29 The lawyers are repeat players30 who be-
come familiar with the disputing practices and practitioners in their
community31 and thus are usually in a better position than their cli-
ents to serve as expert shoppers for mediation services.32
                                                                                                                   
26. For example, nine of Florida’s 20 judicial circuits have more than 200 certified
mediators, with the most (441) working in the 11th Circuit, covering Dade County (Mi-
ami). See Florida Certified Mediators, RESOL. REP., July 1996, at 7.
27. See, e.g., Program Brochure, “The Business of Mediation: A Series of Seminars
for Anyone Who Has Considered Making Mediation a Career!” (1993) (on file with author).
This program, sponsored by the Southern California Mediation Association, spanned three
Saturday mornings in 1993-94. See id.
28. Although many mediators operate as sole practitioners, largely trading on their
personal skills and experiences, there is a major institutional sector of organizations in
which the buyers do not necessarily select individual mediators but rather purchase a
package of services including case administration as well as mediation. On a national
level, some of the best known organizations include the American Arbitration Association,
JAMS/Endispute, and Judicate. There are also local and regional providers of mediation
services. For example, Mediation, Inc. and Florida Mediation Group serve a substantial
share of the South Florida market.
29. See, e.g., ERIC GALTON, REPRESENTING CLIENTS IN MEDIATION 8-24 (1994).
30. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits
of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97-104 (1974); cf. Mark Suchman, On Advice of
Counsel: Law Firms and Venture Capital Funds as Information Intermediaries in the
Structuration of Silicon Valley 95-126 (1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford
University) (on file with author) (observing that, in Silicon Valley, business lawyers’ re-
peated experience of structuring start-up companies and matching them with venture
capital funds enables lawyers to provide valuable advice).
31. The geographical scope of practice communities varies. Many lawyers and media-
tors practice only within a limited area around their offices. Others have regional, na-
tional, and transnational practices. Thus, references to practice communities relate to the
group of colleagues and clients to which practitioners regularly relate, rather than to a lo-
cal geographic area.
32. As Florida mediator Janice Fleischer pointed out, although lawyers are generally
in a better position to evaluate mediators because of their greater experience, they may
not make better selections of mediators in some cases because lawyers and their clients
often have different interests. See Telephone Interview with Janice Fleischer, Coordina-
tor, S. Fla. Off., Fla. Conflict Resol. Consortium (Oct. 26, 1996); see also infra note 174
(discussing differences in interests between attorneys and their clients).
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How does one shop for a mediator?33 I suspect that to a large ex-
tent, buyers of mediation services use processes similar to those of
buyers of other professional services. Presumably, one of the first
things that buyers do is identify mediators who have previously
worked for them or trusted members of their networks of profession-
als. For some buyers, the search may begin and end there. Expert
shoppers have probably worked with and developed this kind of in-
formation about numerous mediators, especially in liti-mediation
cultures. Thus, even these buyers are likely to need additional in-
formation. Does the mediator have much experience (or, better yet,
specialize) in the general type of case involved, such as family, per-
sonal injury, or perhaps more obscure categories of cases?34 Does the
mediator have some kind of certification?35 Is the mediator a former
judge?36 Of course, shoppers may also be sensitive to differences in
the level of mediators’ fees both due to an intrinsic interest in costs
and as a proxy believed to indicate the quality of services. In cases
                                                                                                                   
33. This is an interesting and important question that deserves empirical research. I
offer some hypotheses about the shopping process in this subpart. See Riskin, supra note
9, at 38-39 (discussing the mediator selection process).
34. As the practice of mediation has grown in recent years, mediators can now claim
to have mediated many hundreds, and even thousands, of cases. I have attended numer-
ous events where mediators introduced themselves by saying that they have mediated
more than 1000, 2000, and even 5000 cases.
35. Certification of mediators has become a big business. Individual and organiza-
tional trainers are constantly offering training programs that often provide “graduates”
with certificates suitable for framing and citing as credentials. The most recent Alterna-
tive Newsletter published by Professor James Boskey lists 58 organizations in the United
States that offer training in ADR skills. Many of these organizations offer multiple train-
ings over the course of a year. See Training in ADR Skills, ALTERNATIVE NEWSL., July
1996, at 12-19. Based on the level of practitioner experience, professional organizations
like the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution offer stratified membership catego-
ries that can be used to create market distinctions. See Soc’y of Profs. in Disp. Resol., Ap-
plication for Membership (1995) (on file with author). In Florida, the state government
has gotten into the certification business to the extent that mediators who satisfy the le-
gal requirements routinely advertise that they have been “certified by the [Florida]
[S]upreme [C]ourt.” FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.010(a)(1), (b)(1), (c)(1)
(1996). Recently, a growing number of universities have joined the training and certifica-
tion market. For example, my dispute resolution program at Nova Southeastern Univer-
sity is one of at least 16 university programs in the United States that offer graduate cer-
tificates (typically involving at least ten credits of course work), 10 that offer masters de-
grees, and two that offer doctoral degrees. See Bill Warters, Mapping the Contours of
Graduate Study in Dispute Resolution, (unpublished materials produced for a national
symposium conducted in Fort Lauderdale, Fla., on March 22-24, 1996) (on file with
author).
36. Some mediators and mediation organizations showcase mediators’ prior judicial
experience as a prime selling point. Indeed, the Wall Street Journal recently profiled the
competition between ADR firms in recruiting former judges with “marquee power” such as
a former chief justice of the California Supreme Court. Margaret A. Jacobs, Renting Jus-
tice: Retired Judges Seize Rising Role in Settling Disputes in California, WALL ST. J., July
26, 1996, at A1. An official in one ADR company compared his firm with a merchandiser,
saying, “[j]udges are like our inventory.” Id. Judicial experience is likely to be especially
valued by buyers seeking mediators with an “evaluative” style or settlement-orientation.
See infra note 40.
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that are, or might be, litigated, the significance of mediation charges
is likely to be more symbolic than financial, considering that the dif-
ferences in mediation costs are likely to be relatively small in the
context of total litigation costs. Note that the criteria described in
this paragraph are fairly standard, objective, and easy to ascertain.
Given the substantial populations of mediators in many markets,
however, these criteria may not be adequate to weed out enough me-
diators to narrow the shopping search sufficiently to select a par-
ticular mediator, or these may not be the primary criteria that some
buyers use. No doubt, some buyers will be very interested in whether
particular mediators are more or less sympathetic to some types of
parties (notably those with characteristics like the principals in a
given dispute) and thus whether they are truly impartial. Although
classic mediation theory requires or assumes that mediators are im-
partial, certainly many lawyers and principals hope that a mediator
will be especially helpful to their side. For example, in mediation of
tort cases, mediation shoppers may wonder whether the mediator
tends to favor plaintiffs or defendants. If the opposing party or law-
yer is “difficult,” can the mediator effectively “handle” them?37 If
there are cultural differences between the parties, is the mediator
sensitive to these differences?38 While all these distinctions may be
helpful, mediation buyers may be especially interested in distin-
guishing mediation services based more on what mediators actually
do in mediation. In the next subpart, we consider some differences in
mediators’ styles and philosophies.
B.   Mediator Styles and Goals
Mediation buyers will often want to distinguish the working
styles of the mediators and match them to the perceived needs in
particular cases or to the buyers’ own general preferences about me-
diator styles and goals. This is where empirical research on media-
tors’ promotional communications about their styles and especially
the buyers’ investigation and decisionmaking would be helpful. It
would be interesting to see how the classifications used by mediation
buyers and sellers relate to those developed by theorists.39 For ex-
                                                                                                                   
37. I am grateful to Palo Alto, California, mediator Althea Lee Jordan for suggesting
the preceding buying criteria in this paragraph.
38. I am grateful to Palo Alto, California, mediator Michael J. Lowy for suggesting
this criterion.
39. In daily life, people often use informal categories that reflect and affect their be-
havior. For example, Professors Lynn Mather, Richard Maiman, and Craig McEwen found
that New Hampshire divorce lawyers use a variety of characterizations of their colleagues
that presumably describe and affect the behavior of divorce lawyers and those with whom
they deal. The categorizations include “reasonable,” “client-driven,” “papering” (i.e., en-
gage in excessive discovery and motion practice), “just a business” (i.e., uncommitted to
their clients’ interests), “incompetent,” “cause,” “conflict-escalating” lawyers, “sleepers,”
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ample, when mediators describe their services and lawyers shop for
mediators, do they refer to the distinction between facilitative and
evaluative styles?40 Perhaps some of the more sophisticated buyers
and sellers do and do so explicitly in those terms. However, it is
probably somewhat more common for them to refer to this issue but
to use different terms. For example, market participants may de-
scribe mediators and their styles as weak or strong. Other, more
colloquial expressions may also be used. Thus, more directive media-
tors may be referred to as “muscle mediators,” “Rambo mediators,”
“Attila the mediator(s),”41 or mediators who will “knock some sense”
into the principals by “banging their heads together” or “twisting
their arms.” More facilitative mediators may be referred to as “soft,”
“touchy-feely,” “therapeutic,” “potted plant,” or “new age-y.”42 It is
worth noting that most of these terms have strong and generally
negative connotations. Although classic mediation theory clearly fa-
                                                                                                                   
and “snakes.” Lynn Mather et al., Negotiating a Divorce: Differences Among Lawyers 8,
10, 13-14, 19-21 (June 1991) (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Law and Soci-
ety Association).
40. Mediators using a facilitative style focus on eliciting the principals’ own opinions
and refrain from pressing their own opinions about preferable settlement options. See
Riskin, supra note 9, at 24. Mediators using an evaluative style develop their own opin-
ions about preferable settlement options and may try to influence principals to accept
them. See id. at 23-24. I believe that the term “evaluative” often refers to the level of di-
rectiveness or coercion that a mediator employs to reach a particular agreement or any
agreement, at least at the extreme end of the continuum. Thus, in this Article, I generally
use the term “directive” in place of “evaluative.”
Like most of the distinctions in this field, it is more useful to think of this as a contin-
uum rather than a discrete dichotomy. Presumably most mediators’ styles would fall
somewhere between the two extremes, and the question would be where a mediator’s style
is located on this continuum. The importance of conceptualizing this as a continuum is re-
flected by the fact that a mediator makes multiple interventions in any given case, each of
which might be classified differently. Thus, to identify a mediator’s “true” style would re-
quire some aggregation of multiple interventions and should somehow weigh the varying
degrees that each intervention is facilitative or directive and take into account differing
situational contexts. See Joseph B. Stulberg, Facilitative Versus Evaluative Mediator Ori-
entations: Piercing the “Grid” Lock, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985, 989 (1997). This suggests
that it is probably impossible to create a truly valid measure of this dimension. This need
not, however, prevent theorists and participants in the mediation market from finding the
concept useful. See id. at 1004-05; cf. Stempel, supra note 9, at 952 n.9, 969-70 (criticizing
use of bipolar and continuum models as creating false dichotomies but recognizing their
value for purpose of discussion and analysis)
41. I am grateful to Berkeley, California, mediator Ron Kelly for relating an experi-
ence in which a principal in a mediation referred to the third party as “Attila the media-
tor.”
42. Dean James Alfini used the evocative terms “hashers,” “bashers,” or “trashers,”
which I believe refer to the facilitative-directive distinction. See James J. Alfini, Trashing,
Bashing, and Hashing It Out: Is This the End of “Good Mediation"?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 47, 66-73 (1991). “Hashers” tend to encourage the parties to communicate directly
with each other and are willing to let the principals end the process without agreement.
See id. at 71. “Trashers” work primarily in caucus, pressing to reach agreement by criti-
cizing the merits of each side’s case. See id. at 66-67. “Bashers” focus primarily on criti-
cizing each side’s position in a “mad dash for the middle.” Id. at 70.
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vors minimal directiveness by mediators,43 a substantial number of
mediation buyers and sellers highly value “strong” mediators and
look down upon those they consider too “touchy-feely.”44 Thus, the is-
sue of mediator directiveness clearly stirs fervent passions of theo-
rists and market participants alike and is probably a factor used in
promoting and shopping for mediators.45
Many mediation buyers and sellers probably also focus on the
mediators’ goals in mediation. Professor Robert A. Baruch Bush de-
veloped a typology of mediators based on their identification with
one of five primary goals.46 Bush labels these five types of mediators
as “settlors,” “fixers,” “protectors,” “reconcilors,” and “empowerors.”47
Settlors “see their job as settling cases, period—as many as possible,
as quickly as possible.”48 They tend to believe that what the princi-
pals most want (or need) is simply to end the case. When using a
positional (rather than a problem-solving) approach to mediation,49
                                                                                                                   
43. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 1, at 327-33.
44. See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 9, at 973-75. One Florida mediator with a facilita-
tive philosophy told me that lawyers frequently pressed her to tell the principals “how
much the case is worth” and were quite frustrated when she would not do so.
45. My experience has been that academics are often especially passionate propo-
nents of facilitative approaches and criticize directive approaches, whereas lawyers and
mediators who practice law and mediation for a living often have the opposite passions.
However, there are many in each group who do not fit this generalization. The unflatter-
ing characterizations clearly rankle theorists and practitioners committed to the differing
views. For example, two reviewers who strongly identify with a facilitative approach ex-
pressed concern about including in this Article pejorative references to that approach us-
ing such terms such as “weak,” which they believe is an inaccurate portrayal. On the
other hand, a reviewer with an evaluative approach complained about descriptions of me-
diators’ evaluative settlement efforts as being like portrayals of a night with a prostitute.
Though I agree that these are often misleading characterizations, the fact that these epi-
thets are widely used—and touch sensitive nerves—says a lot about the current state of
the field. See generally infra Part II.C.
46. See Robert A. Baruch Bush, Ethical Dilemmas in Mediation 17-18 (1989) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author). Bush notes that mediators often aspire to several
or all of the goals, but that the goals sometimes conflict and the mediators must then
choose between them. See id. at 15-17. Even when the goals do not conflict, many media-
tors unambiguously favor some goals over others. Nonetheless, the typology necessarily
oversimplifies mediator motivation and behavior to some extent. Although in practice
there are probably few, if any, mediators who perfectly embody the pure types such as set-
tlors and empowerors, these labels do reflect some basic differences and will be used for
convenience.
In The Promise of Mediation, Bush presents a somewhat different typology of mediators’
goals. See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 10, at 15-32. I refer to the goals from Bush’s earlier
manuscript because they better capture the distinctions between the goals, as described
below. See infra note 54. Bush’s descriptions of the five roles are fairly brief. The descrip-
tions in this Article include my own elaborations of Bush’s typology.
47. See Bush, supra note 46, at 17-18.
48. Id. at 17.
49. In a positional (or adversarial) approach, each participant sets extreme aspiration
levels and makes a series of strategic offers intended to result in a resolution as close as
possible to that person’s initial aspiration. See FISHER ET AL., supra note 14, at 4-7. A
problem-solving approach involves a joint identification and selection of options maxi-
mizing the interests of all principals. See id. at 40-80; see also Riskin, supra note 9, at 13-
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settlors often assume that all participants will be pleased to be rid of
the dispute even though some, and possibly all, of the participants
may be disappointed with the outcome of mediation. Not surpris-
ingly, the mediator’s settlement rate is likely to be critically impor-
tant to mediation buyers and sellers for whom settlement is the pri-
mary goal.50 An emphasis on settlement lends itself to being highly
directive and thus may be characterized in practice with some of the
same terms—such as “strong”—as a directive style generally. How-
ever, mediators who focus on other goals may also be quite directive,
as we shall see shortly.
Another type of mediator, whom Bush calls “fixers,” emphasizes
the development of optimal solutions.51 For fixers, “their job is to
help the parties by relieving them of their problem and finding them
the best possible solution to it—best for both parties, that is.”52 The
quintessential fixers are “getting-to-yes” joint problem-solvers. They
want to consider all the relevant information and options and then
craft the solution that works best for all the principals.53 Fixers
probably vary in their levels of directiveness. Some may develop
strong opinions about the best result for the principals and press
them to accept it, while other fixers may be content to generate de-
sirable options but be relatively detached about the principals’ deci-
sions.54 Mediation buyers looking for fixers might identify the de-
sired quality as being especially “knowledgeable,” “creative,” or
“smart.”
Some of Bush’s other types of mediators seem like variants of the
general “fixer” species. “Protectors” are especially concerned with
preventing any principal (especially those perceived to be weaker)
from experiencing an unfair process and/or receiving an adverse out-
come.55 Protectors “see their job as making sure that nobody gets
hurt or taken advantage of in the mediation process, and—in some
cases—that not only the process but the final outcome is basically
fair.”56 Like the fixers, protectors focus generally on the quality of the
outcome (or process), but focus primarily on avoiding harm rather
                                                                                                                   
16 (citing sources and noting variety of terms used to distinguish problem-solving and
positional approaches).
50. Critics are concerned that settlors may be more interested in getting “another
notch on their belts” than in the substantive quality of the mediated resolution. See Frank
E.A. Sander, The Obsession with Settlement Rates, 11 NEGOTIATION J. 329, 329-31 (1995).
51. See Bush, supra note 46, at 17.
52. Id.
53. See id.
54. In his subsequent book with Joseph Folger, Bush uses the more widely used term
“problem-solving” (which I prefer), referring to the goals of fixers. Bush and Folger also
describe this orientation as “directive, settlement-oriented,” which lumps together two ap-
proaches that often do not go together. BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 10, at 12.
55. See Bush, supra note 46, at 17-18.
56. Id.
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than producing optimal benefit. Mediation buyers might describe
protectors as “protective” or “prudent.”
Mediators of Bush’s “reconcilor” type are particularly concerned
about the relationships between the principals and try to get the
principals “to come to some kind of a new and more accepting under-
standing of one another.”57 One might think of these mediators as
fixers who focus on the quality of the process in mediation itself—
and especially the quality of the resulting relationships—as possibly
more important than the specifics of any agreements reached.
Moreover, reconcilors may expand the scope of attention to include
relationships with individuals not in the mediation. One might ex-
pect reconcilors to be concentrated in the ranks of community and
family mediators, though there may well be a cadre of reconcilors
who handle stereotypically hard-boiled problems such as those in
business. Mediation buyers might refer to reconcilors as “sensitive”
or “therapeutic.” Many reconcilors may favor less-directive tactics
(which is why the term “therapeutic” might be used regarding both
techniques and goals), though this need not always be the case.
Some therapeutic mediators with strong beliefs about the impor-
tance of relationships may be quite directive, such as, for example,
when a family mediator presses divorcing parents very hard to de-
velop a good working relationship for the benefit of their children.
Bush refers to the fifth type of mediators as “empowerors.”58 They
focus on helping the principals “to exercise their power of self-
determination to resolve the dispute on whatever terms they think
best.”59 One might think of empowerors as fixers who reject a direc-
tive approach. Empowerors are likely to work hard to get the princi-
pals to examine their options and their own interests, but display de-
tachment about the options selected as long as the principals have
engaged in a certain amount of careful deliberation. Lawyers are not
typically interested in promoting their clients’ self-reflection,60 so it
seems unlikely that many lawyers would seek out mediators with
empowerment philosophies. Still, some disputants may be most in-
terested in this approach. Such mediation buyers might describe the
kind of mediators they seek as “thorough and systematic.”
As this tour of mediator styles and goals demonstrates, some
widely different activities take place in the name of mediation.
                                                                                                                   
57. Id. at 18. This is similar to Bush and Folger’s concept of recognition. See BUSH &
FOLGER, supra, note 10, at 2.
58. Bush, supra note 46, at 18.
59. Id.
60. Lawyers often say things such as that they hope the mediator will help them (the
lawyers) when they have a “hard sell” with recalcitrant clients. See McEwen et al., supra
note 23, at 1370. To that extent, lawyers may want a mediation to promote self-reflection.
However, in such situations, the lawyers really want to reduce the principals’ control and
lower their expectations, not increase their self-determination.
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Should all these activities be entitled to carry the mediation label? I
consider this question in the next subpart.
C.   Single-School and Pluralist Theories of Mediation
This exercise speculating about the process of shopping for media-
tion services is useful for analyzing how mediation markets may be-
come institutionalized by developing a generally accepted vocabulary
reflecting distinctions within these markets. This institutionaliza-
tion process entails both the conscious activity of “intellectual entre-
preneurs” (such as promoters of mediation services, policymakers,
and academic theorists and researchers)61 and the less-conscious in-
teractions of individual buyers and sellers in the market. Over time,
some conceptions gain currency and others fall into disuse. Institu-
tionalization processes occur in relatively unsettled situations with
“bursts of ideological activism” in which ideologies compete for domi-
nance.62 After these ideological contests are settled, actions are
guided by taken-for-granted traditions and what is perceived as
common sense.63 It seems clear that we are now right in the middle
of such a period of ideological contest.64
A fundamental issue in this institutionalization of mediation is
whether there should be a single, relatively pure, conception of me-
diation that is appropriate for all mediators (which I call the “single-
school” view), or whether a variety of conceptions should be accepted
                                                                                                                   
61. Professor Paul DiMaggio argues that the success of an institutionalization project
is usually premised on certain types of conceptualizations that institutional entrepreneurs
advance:
Unless [legitimating conceptualizations] are enacted by an organizational sys-
tem that segments labor markets, evokes consumer (or state) demand, manu-
factures new areas of expertise, and classifies new products and services as
qualitatively different from old ones, newly institutionalized forms will be
highly unstable in their structures, public theories, and programs.
. . . Recruiting or creating an environment that can enact their claims is the
central task that institutional entrepreneurs face in carrying out a successful
institutionalization project.
Paul J. DiMaggio, Interest and Agency in Institutional Theory, in INSTITUTIONAL
PATTERNS AND ORGANIZATIONS: CULTURE AND ENVIRONMENT 3, 15 (Lynne G. Zucker ed.,
1988) (citations omitted).
62. Ann Swidler, Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies, 51 AMER. SOC. REV. 273,
279 (1986).
63. See id. at 279-81.
64. See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 10, at 12. Bush and Folger make this contest
quite explicit, arguing that the mediation movement is now at a “crossroads” where the
mediation community must decide between a settlement-oriented, problem-solving ap-
proach and a transformative approach as the primary strategy for mediation. Id. The in-
tense reaction to their book, pro and con, suggests that they have indeed “touched a
nerve” and that the “correct” resolution of this matter is anything but taken for granted in
the mediation community generally. See supra note 10.
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as legitimate (which I refer to as the “pluralist” view).65 The “single-
school” view seems to be quite popular among mediators, judging
from casual conversations I have heard at gatherings of mediators,
though single-school mediators differ as to just what that school
should be. Dean James Alfini captured this ethos in quoting a com-
ment by a mediator who distinguished what she believed to be “good”
mediation—some mediators call it “real mediation”66—from what she
considered substandard mediation practice.67 For example, many
mediators can identify quite clearly whether they subscribe to a fa-
cilitative or evaluative approach and to which goals they aspire. Not
only do these mediators attest to the merits of their own approach,
but they cast doubt on the merits of the others, as reflected in the
less-than-flattering characterizations of the others as described
above.68 Professors Kimberlee Kovach and Lela Love clearly articu-
late a positive rationale for a single standard of acceptable media-
tion:
To develop rules, standards, ethical norms and certification re-
quirements, legislators and administrators need well-defined and
uniform processes. Similarly, meaningful program evaluations re-
quire uniformity. . . . “Mediation” should mean the same thing
from state to state, and from one court to another within a state.69
Some who hold a single-school view somewhat reluctantly accept the
legitimacy of what they view as substandard mediation practices but
plead, “Just don’t call it mediation.”70
                                                                                                                   
65. Others have also used the term “pluralist” in this context. See, e.g., Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 10, at 236. For other descriptions of pluralist philosophies, see Stem-
pel, supra note 9, at 950 (favoring an “eclectic model”); MOORE, supra note 1, at 53-55 (op-
posing “narrow” definition of mediation); Robert B. Moberly, Mediator Gag Rules: Is It
Ethical for Mediators to Evaluate or Advise?, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 1997) (dis-
tinguishing whether theorists favor pure “bright line” definition of mediation or not);
James B. Boskey, Let 100 Flowers Bloom, ALTERNATIVE NEWSL., Nov. 1996, at 1. I have
used a related concept of “process pluralism,” referring to acceptance of the legitimacy of a
variety of third-party ADR procedures See Lande, supra note 8, at 7-8. This is in contrast
to legal centralism, which holds that the courts, the law, and lawyers are and should be
the primary means for handling disputes involving legal issues. See id.
66. McEwen et al., supra note 23, at 1392.
67. See Alfini, supra note 42, at 47.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42. The fact that many of my dispute
resolution students who have little or no professional mediation experience have very
strong convictions about the “right” and “wrong” approaches is further evidence that these
differences run deep.
69. Kovach & Love, supra note 9, at 32; see also Bush, supra note 46, at 20.
70. This is often expressed by mediators holding facilitative and empowerment phi-
losophies who believe that directive and settlor approaches should be called “mediation-
arbitration” (often referred to as “med-arb”), “nonbinding arbitration,” “neutral case
evaluation,” or “private settlement conferencing.” See, e.g., Kovach & Love, supra note 9,
at 32; Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 937, 948 (1997).
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I am skeptical of a single-school approach for both philosophical
and pragmatic reasons. Although I have my own preferences in me-
diation philosophy—I lean toward an approach promoting principals’
exercise of responsibility in decisionmaking71—I am a pluralist be-
cause I believe that there is a positive value in having a diverse
market that offers a wide variety of legitimate options for both me-
diation buyers and sellers. As a practical matter, I doubt that it is
possible either to limit the style of mediator practices or to enforce a
single-school usage of the term “mediation.”72 Rather than trying to
maintain distinctions about what is and isn’t “real mediation,” it
would be more productive to try to concretely define distinct varieties
of mediation in ways that are clearly recognizable by participants in
the mediation market. While this would be no easy task in itself, I
believe it is more likely to be successful and productive.73
                                                                                                                   
71. Substantively, this is somewhat similar to what Bush and Folger refer to as an
“empowerment” approach. See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 10, at 2. I do not like the
“empowerment” label because it gives an impression of mediators conveying power to the
principals. This is not necessarily an accurate description of behavior of practicing me-
diators who use this label. Moreover, even as an ideal reflecting the best intentions, I
believe that mediators should not be trying to manipulate the power of principals. Fi-
nally, the term has become so clichéd in usage as to lose clear meaning. Below, I elabo-
rate my view of a substantively similar, though differently labeled, approach. See infra
Part III.A.
72. As the profiles of mediators in Deborah Kolb’s book demonstrate, the range of
mediation practices is indeed quite diverse, and it would be difficult to disenfranchise me-
diators from using the title. See generally WHEN TALK WORKS, supra note 13.
73. When explaining his rationale for using an inclusive approach in his categoriza-
tions of mediation, Leonard Riskin expressed the pluralist view very well:
I hope to facilitate discussions and to help clarify arguments by providing a
system for categorizing and understanding approaches to mediation. I try to
include in my system most activities that are commonly called mediation and
arguably fall within the broad definition of the term. I know that some media-
tors object to such inclusiveness, and fear that somehow it will legitimize ac-
tivities that are inconsistent with the goals that they associate with mediation.
Although I sympathize with this view, I also disagree with it. Usage deter-
mines meaning. It is too late for commentators or mediation organizations to
tell practitioners who are widely recognized as mediators that they are not, in
the same sense that it is too late for the Pizza Association of Naples, Italy to
tell Domino’s that its product is not the genuine article. Such an effort would
both cause acrimony and increase the confusion that I am trying to diminish.
Instead, I propose that we try to categorize the various approaches to media-
tion so that we can better understand and choose among them.
Riskin, supra note 9, at 13 (footnotes omitted). Advocates of a single-school approach, see,
e.g., Kovach & Love, supra note 9, at 32, and pluralists agree on the need for clearly un-
derstood distinctions in the mediation market. They differ regarding whether it is more
appropriate and practical to use the term “mediation” as the distinguishing label or to use
qualifiers distinguishing different varieties of mediation instead. I believe that limiting
the use of the term “mediation” does not solve the problem because there is confusion be-
tween mediation and similar processes (like mini-trials), as well as between styles of what
is commonly called “mediation.” See infra notes 103, 107-22 and accompanying text. It is
too much to expect the single term “mediation” to distinguish various subtly different pro-
cesses. Distinct and meaningful descriptors can provide more information about the sub-
stantive differences being established.
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As we have seen, the mediation market is quite diverse and cur-
rently in the process of institutionalization. Theorists and market
participants are struggling to develop what they hope will become
taken-for-granted definitions. These arguments over terminology are
not “just” academic exercises; these debates shape the practices of
mediators and lawyers regarding what it means to be a “good” prac-
titioner, referring to shared meanings and norms within one’s prac-
tice community.74 Thus, for mediators and lawyers to succeed in
practice, especially in liti-mediation environments, most mediators
will need to relate their practices to generally-accepted definitions,
and lawyers will need to distinguish key differences in mediation
practices. The next part of this Article illustrates a behavioral de-
scription of one important dimension of mediation.
III.   APPROACHING THE IDEAL OF “HIGH-QUALITY CONSENT”
As suggested in Part II, there is now a major controversy over
whether the primary goal of mediation should be to achieve the out-
come of case settlement (the view of Bush’s settlors) or to provide a
deliberative decisionmaking process in which principals exercise
their best judgment (the view of Bush’s empowerors).75 There is also
a related contest over the degree of pressure, if any, that is appropri-
ate for mediators to exert on principals (Riskin’s facilitative-
evaluative distinction).76 This Part focuses on these controversies,
which are important issues that lawyers and mediators will in-
creasingly need to confront. These issues define significant distinc-
tions that lawyers and mediators will rely upon in the mediation
market77 because they reflect important variations in actual law-
yering and mediation procedures.78
Part III.A examines an empowerment perspective or, as I prefer
to call it, an approach promoting principals’ exercise of their deci-
sionmaking responsibility. This subpart analyzes the goals of this
approach and examines two cases illustrating problematic mediation
practices from this perspective. To provide a contrast with the higher
standards of what I call “high-quality consent,” Part III.B reviews
the legal standards of consent required for any settlement. In Part
III.C, I define “high-quality consent” as a condition in which a prin-
cipal has exercised his or her responsibility for making decisions in a
dispute by considering the situation sufficiently and without exces-
sive pressure. This subpart identifies seven factors that can be used
                                                                                                                   
74. See John Lande, Mediation Paradigms and Professional Identities, MEDIATION Q.,
June 1984, at 19, 41-45.
75. See supra notes 46-50, 58-59 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 9.
77. See supra Part II.
78. See infra Part IV.C.
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to define the quality of consent that a mediation process has
achieved; I contend that achieving high-quality consent should be an
important goal in mediation.79 Because high-quality consent is de-
fined as a continuous, rather than a dichotomous, concept, it sug-
gests that the issue is not whether high-quality consent has been
achieved but rather the level of quality.
A.   Concepts of Empowerment and Principals’ Exercise of
Decisionmaking Responsibility
Recently, there has been a revival of interest in “empowerment”
as the principal goal of mediation. This was often the motivation for
mediation at the dawn of the modern ADR era, especially in neigh-
borhood mediation projects.80 As lawyers and courts became in-
creasingly involved in offering or encouraging use of mediation in the
1980s, much of the focus shifted to efficiently handling larger vol-
umes of cases and removing them from court dockets.81 That shift of
emphasis toward settlement was accompanied by the use of more di-
rective mediation techniques.82 I suspect that much of the current
revival of interest in empowerment is a (often horrified) reaction to
the institutionalization of directive, settlement-focused mediation.83
                                                                                                                   
79. Several reviewers noted what seemed to them to be an inconsistency between my
advocacy of pluralism in mediation philosophies, see supra notes 71-73 and accompanying
text, and my version of empowerment. However, this does not seem inconsistent to me.
Like Riskin, having my own preferences “does not keep me from seeing the virtues of
other approaches in appropriate cases,” Riskin, supra note 9, at 13 n.17, and, I would add,
with clear disclosure in all cases. Offering mediation buyers and sellers a wide range of
choices is an even higher value for me than having a market limited to my preferred ap-
proach. Thus, I favor a vibrant mediation market in which advocates of different ap-
proaches fairly highlight the relative advantages of their approaches so that principals are
given clear choices.
Bush and Folger argue that it is unlikely that, if offered their transformative style of
mediation, potential mediation users would reject it. See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 10,
at 276-78. To support this view, Bush cites social science research describing general
characteristics of dispute resolution procedures disputants favor that are consistent with a
transformative model. See Robert A. Baruch Bush, “What Do We Need a Mediator For?”
Mediation’s Value-Added for Negotiators, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 6-26 (1996).
Even if the vast majority of mediation users would prefer transformative mediation if of-
fered a clear set of choices, I would still want to respect the preferences of the minority
who would prefer other styles, such as the settlor-style that I do not prefer. Providing
principals with a choice between styles of mediation is very consistent with the value of
promoting their responsibility for decisionmaking that is so central to empowerment phi-
losophies.
80. See generally Peter Adler et al., The Ideologies of Mediation: The Movement’s
Own Story, 10 L. & POL’Y 317 (1988).
81. As some commentators have pointed out, many cases settled in mediation would
probably have been settled through direct negotiation even without mediation. See, e.g.,
McEwen et al., supra note 23, at 1373. Thus, it is not completely accurate to think of me-
diation as removing cases from a court’s trial docket.
82. See supra note 40.
83. See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 10, at 1-12.
1997]                         LAWYERING AND MEDIATION 859
This revival is reflected by the recent publication of several books on
empowerment,84 especially Bush and Professor Joseph P. Folger’s
The Promise of Mediation: Responding to Conflict Through
Empowerment and Recognition ,85 which has stimulated a great deal
of discussion and controversy within the mediation community.
What do people mean by the term “empowerment”? Professor Ed-
ward Schwerin presents a fascinating analysis of how the term has
been used in social science literature generally as well as in the me-
diation literature.86 Schwerin finds that theorists differ in the extent
to which they refer to empowerment of individuals87 or transforma-
tion of large-scale social and political relationships. While some of
the mediation movement literature (and much of the social science
literature) focuses on achievement of macro-political goals,88 virtu-
ally all of the mediation theorists (as well as the social science theo-
rists) include individual transformation as a major element of
empowerment.
                                                                                                                   
84. See EDWARD W. SCHWERIN, MEDIATION, CITIZEN EMPOWERMENT, AND
TRANSFORMATIONAL POLITICS (1995); JONATHAN G. SHAILOR, EMPOWERMENT IN DISPUTE
RESOLUTION (1994); KATHY DOMENICI, MEDIATION: EMPOWERMENT IN CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT (1995).
85. BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 10. This book caps more than a decade of interest of
both authors in this subject. Bush’s publications include: Robert A. Baruch Bush, Dispute
Resolution Alternatives and the Goals of Civil Justice: Jurisdictional Principles for Process
Choice, 1984 WISC. L. REV. 893 [hereinafter Bush, Jurisdictional Principles for Process
Choice]; Robert A. Baruch Bush, Mediation and Adjudication, Dispute Resolution and Ide-
ology: An Imaginary Conversation, 3 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1 (1989); Robert A.
Baruch Bush, Defining Quality in Dispute Resolution: Taxonomies and Anti-Taxonomies of
Quality Arguments, 66 DENV. U. L. REV 335 (1989); Robert A. Baruch Bush, Efficiency and
Protection, or Empowerment and Recognition? The Mediator’s Role and Ethical Standards
in Mediation, 41 FLA. L. REV. 253 (1989); Bush, supra note 79. Folger’s publications in-
clude: Sydney E. Bernard et al., The Neutral Mediator: Value Dilemmas in Divorce Media-
tion, MEDIATION Q., June 1984, at 61; Joseph P. Folger & Sydney E. Bernard, Divorce Me-
diation: When Mediators Challenge the Divorcing Parties, MEDIATION Q., December 1985,
at 5; JOSEPH P. FOLGER ET AL., WORKING THROUGH CONFLICT: STRATEGIES FOR
RELATIONSHIPS, GROUPS, AND ORGANIZATIONS (1993); Joseph P. Folger & Robert A.
Baruch Bush, Ideology, Orientations to Conflict and Mediation Discourse, in NEW
DIRECTIONS IN MEDIATION (Joseph P. Folger & Tricia S. Jones, eds., 1994); Joseph P. Fol-
ger & Robert A. Baruch Bush, Transformative Mediation and Third Party Intervention:
Ten Hallmarks of a Transformative Approach to Practice, 13 MEDIATION Q. 263 (1996)
[hereinafter Folger & Bush, Ten Hallmarks].
86. See SCHWERIN, supra note 84, at 55-91.
87. Although the individuals to be empowered specifically in the mediation context
presumably are the principals, Schwerin finds that some of the mediation literature fo-
cuses on empowerment of the mediators. See id. at 77-79. Some studies of empowerment-
oriented community mediation find that the mediators were indeed quite empowered, but
that the principals were less so. See, e.g., Judy H. Rothschild, Dispute Transformation, the
Influence of a Communication Paradigm of Disputing, and the San Francisco Community
Boards Program, in THE POSSIBILITY OF POPULAR JUSTICE: A CASE STUDY OF COMMUNITY
MEDIATION IN THE UNITED STATES 265, 319-20 (Sally Engle Merry & Neal Milner, eds., 1993).
88. These social and political goals include promotion of political awareness and par-
ticipation, as well as outcomes of increased participation, greater social and material re-
sources for the disadvantaged in society, and enforcement of legal rights protecting politi-
cal participation. See SCHWERIN, supra note 84, at 81-87.
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This Article focuses only on individual-level empowerment. This
narrower definition of transformation deals with the development of
individuals’ knowledge, skills, and resources, typically focusing on
those needed to resolve a particular dispute.89 Bush and Folger’s
definition of empowerment encompasses elements of individual
empowerment, using particular disputes as opportunities for per-
sonal transformation generally. They write that “empowerment is
achieved when disputing parties experience a strengthened aware-
ness of their own self-worth and their own ability to deal with what-
ever difficulties they face, regardless of external constraints.”90 In
this view, people become empowered in mediation when they better
understand their goals, options, skills, and resources, and then make
conscious decisions about how they want to handle a dispute.91 Thus,
Bush and Folger contend that a mediator oriented toward promoting
empowerment would routinely and persistently act to help the prin-
cipals become more deliberative in making decisions in a dispute.92
Bush and Folger do not conceive of empowerment as requiring me-
diators to be passive. Indeed, they argue that good transformative
mediators should “push” principals to focus on the issues as much as
possible, and that failing to do so would deprive principals of the
greatest potential benefits of mediation.93 In essence, transformative
mediators try, gently but firmly, to help the principals in a dispute
responsibly exercise their decisionmaking authority.94
Why do theorists and practitioners who are concerned about
empowerment consider the principals’ exercise of their responsibility
to be so important? There are several reasons. For some, at least
                                                                                                                   
89. See id. at 77-78. Schwerin also finds that many mediators’ discussions of
empowerment include the related goals of promoting individuals’ self-esteem and sense of
control over their environments more generally (i.e., not limited to a specific dispute) and
reducing dependency on professional and social services. While this general learning is of-
ten a very valuable product of mediation, it does not seem to be an element of consent. See
infra Part III.C.
Some mediators associate the concept of empowerment with “equalizing” or “balancing”
the power between the principals. See SCHWERIN, supra note 84, at 79; see also BUSH &
FOLGER, supra note 10, at 95-96. I agree with Bush and Folger’s critique that conceiving
empowerment in terms of power balancing undermines mediators’ efforts at impartiality.
Moreover, I believe that it is virtually impossible for anyone to accurately measure and
then balance power between principals. Thus, I do not use “empowerment” or similar con-
cepts to incorporate the notion of equalizing power. This is not to say that mediators can-
not or should not raise questions about whether differences in power are having or should
have a substantial impact on the process and outcome in a mediation.
90. BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 10, at 84.
91. See id. at 85-87.
92. See id. at 95.
93. See id. at 210-211.
94. I use the term “exercise” rather than “take” or “assume” because the latter terms
suggest that the responsibility was not originally that of the principals. The term “retain”
thus seems more accurate, but does not reflect the active exercise of responsibility that I
intend to convey (and promote).
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part of the reason is instrumental: they believe that if principals ex-
ercise responsibility for their decisions and actions, it will produce
benefits for the principals themselves, those they deal with, and so-
ciety generally.95 For some, exercising responsibility is an ultimate
value in itself—or really two related values.96 Probably most com-
monly expressed is the belief in the value of individuals making un-
coerced decisions for and about themselves as an intrinsic good.97
The terms “autonomy” and “self-determination”98 reflect this view
that values individuals’ unrestrained freedom to act as they choose,
obviously limited by the rights (and perhaps reasonable expecta-
tions) of others.99 A refinement of this perspective particularly values
the making of informed and considered  decisions.100 In this view,
principals carefully consider their situations and accept responsibil-
ity for making possibly difficult choices.101
As noted above, some advocates of empowerment are motivated in
reaction to the spread of a strongly directive style of mediation.102
From this perspective, directive-style mediation actively undermines
principals’ self-determination by pressuring principals to accept par-
ticular proposals based on others’ judgments rather than the princi-
pals’ own careful deliberation. We can get a sense of the problems
seen in directive mediation by reviewing the description of a mini-
trial103 conducted by Professor Eric Green. Green is a pioneering and
                                                                                                                   
95. See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 10, at 28-32.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. For example, official rules in Florida are designed to protect principals’ “self-
determination.” FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.060. Similarly, the first point
in the Model Standards of Conduct for mediators developed by the American Arbitration
Association, the American Bar Association, and the Society for Professionals in Dispute
Resolution is that “self-determination is the fundamental principle of mediation.” MODEL
STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS Standard I (Am. Arb. Ass’n et al. 1994).
99. Professor Ellen Waldman describes what she calls a “norm-generating model” of
mediation in which unfettered party autonomy is the ultimate goal of mediation. Ellen A.
Waldman, The Challenge of Certification: How to Ensure Mediator Competence While Pre-
serving Diversity, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 723, 733 (1996).
100. Waldman uses the term “norm-educating model,” referring to an approach based
on the assumption that parties must be educated about relevant norms (e.g., information
about legal entitlements and relevant financial, technical, and psychological data) to truly
exercise autonomy. Id. at 734-35. Her trichotomy is completed with a “norm-advocating
model” in which party autonomy is an important value, but one subordinated to the
achievement of other values, such as goals established by various statutes. Id. at 735.
101. See id. at 732.
102. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
103. The term “mini-trial” is somewhat misleading because, at least in theory, it is
more like mediation than a trial. Mini-trials, which are most often used in business dis-
putes, begin with summary presentations by lawyers to a panel consisting of high-level
executives from each side. See STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION 230
(1992). After the lawyers’ presentations, a “neutral advisor” assists the parties in negotia-
tion, possibly giving a prediction of the likely results in litigation. See id.
Although this case is usually referred to as a mini-trial in the published account, it is
sometimes described as a mediation. Moreover, the case is highlighted in a book subtitled
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prominent mediator who was a co-founder of Endispute,104 and who
“likes the role of ‘power mediator’ or ‘mediator with clout.’ ”105 In one
case described by a colleague and protégé of Green’s, an employer
fired a sales representative who sued the employer for breach of con-
tract and willful infliction of emotional distress.106 In this case, Green
received a referral from a judge, then called the principals’ lawyers,
explaining that the judge suggested that he (Green) might be able to
help settle the case. The judge had provided a great deal of informa-
tion about the case to Green, including his impressions of the merits
of the case.107 To prepare for the mini-trial, during the weeks pre-
ceding its onset, Green had a series of conversations with both sides,
mostly with each side separately.108 In a conversation with the re-
searcher writing the profile, Green described his process as gather-
ing information and developing his own early assessment of pros-
pects for settlement, including key issues and appropriate settle-
ment values.109 For example, apparently early in the mini-trial itself,
                                                                                                                   
“Profiles of Mediators.” From the description of the process, it could have consistently
been called a directive mediation. See Kolb & Kressel, supra note 13, at 473-74. It pres-
ents the same issues about exercise of responsibility even if it were consistently called a
mini-trial. This is one reason why I believe that simply “not calling it mediation” would
not resolve the underlying controversies about appropriate dispute resolution techniques.
See supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
104. Endispute later merged with the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Service
(JAMS), and is now called JAMS/Endispute. See S. Gale Dick, Making ADR Profitable, 13
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 1, 4 (1995).
105. Lavinia Hall, Eric Green: Finding Alternatives to Litigation in Business Disputes,
in WHEN TALK WORKS, supra note 13, at 306. Green also described the mediator’s role as a
“pest-advocate for settlement.” Id. at 286.
106. See id. at 285.
107. See id. at 286. The researcher describes the conversation with the judge as fol-
lows:
The parties appear to be at the point where the company would offer
$350,000, while the plaintiff[’s] . . . attorney has mentioned $750,000 during
the settlement conference. The salesman has alleged damages as high as $7
million. The judge tells Green that “heavy discovery” has already been done.
The case cannot be calendared for trial for three months, but a firm trial date
can be set then if it will create the right incentives to encourage the defendant
to settle. It is the judge’s understanding that the plaintiff is hurting for cash.
An expensive trial in three months, with the prospect of an appeal by the los-
ing party (which in all likelihood will take another year), will result in the
plaintiff losing his house. The plaintiff has strong incentives to settle. Finally,
the judge notes that the plaintiff’s attorney, a bright junior partner in a big
firm, seems very invested in the case and has spent a lot of time on it.
Id. at 286. In what turned out to be a critical effort to influence the process, Green en-
couraged the plaintiff’s attorney to bring to the mini-trial a senior partner who could
“judge the case from a business point of view, not just a legal one.” Id. at 290. After the
case settled, the plaintiff told Green that it was the senior partner who advised him (and
the junior partner) to accept the ultimate $550,000 offer. See id. at 301. “ ‘Otherwise,’ the
plaintiff says, he feels ‘sure that my lawyer [the junior partner] would have advised me
not to accept.’ ” Id.
108. See id. at 286.
109. See id.
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Green told the researcher that he thought that the settlement range
was $500,000 to $600,000.110 Green freely expressed his opinions to
the principals and gave them strong advice based on his assess-
ments. For example, in a private conversation before the mini-trial
began, he told the plaintiff, “Do you really think the court will ex-
clude that evidence? I disagree.”111 At another point, he said, “My
advice would be to drop the claim for ‘willful infliction of emotional
distress.’ In my opinion, that claim could be extremely messy.”112
When the plaintiff insisted on more than $600,000, the maximum
appropriate amount under Green’s litigation decision analysis, he
asked the plaintiff, “How greedy can you get?”113 Green got very an-
gry late in the process when the defendant’s representatives refused
to accept a $550,000 offer which, from their earlier statements,
Green had inferred they might accept.114 The formal mini-trial ses-
sion went nonstop for thirteen hours—from noon to 1:00 a.m. The
day was even longer than that, considering that Green started the day
with an 8:00 a.m. meeting with the president of the defendant com-
pany and its attorneys.115 Green used caucuses116 extensively, keeping
the sides separated for seven hours.117 At 11:00 p.m., the plaintiff
suggested stopping for the night, but Green told the researcher that
he “want[ed] to keep the heat on and settle tonight . . . . Their desire
to go home may be the fuel needed for final settlement.”118 Pressing
hard on the defendant’s representatives, Green said the defendant
should know “that the judge has no desire to hear this case,” sug-
gesting that the court might rule against the defendant if it fails to
“live up to its moral obligations” to settle the case.119 Green finally
brought the parties together after hammering out an agreement in
which the defendant agreed to pay $550,000 in three installments
                                                                                                                   
110. See id. at 298.
111. Id. at 297.
112. Id. at 293.
113. Id. at 299.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 297-98.
116. A caucus is when the mediator meets separately with some of the participants.
Typically, the mediator meets with one side—including both a principal and his or her
lawyer if the lawyer attends the mediation—and then the other side. There are many pos-
sible variations because a mediator may meet with a single principal or lawyer, just the
lawyers, or just the principals. Many mediators set a “ground rule” that statements in
caucus are confidential unless the principal agrees to permit the mediator to disclose par-
ticular information. See generally MOORE, supra note 1, at 318-26.
117. See Hall, supra note 105, at 300. Miami mediator John W. Salmon uses the term
“terminal caucus” to refer to a process in which virtually all of the mediation is conducted
in caucus and the participants reconvene all together only after the mediator has finished
working out an agreement by “shuttling” back and forth between separate meetings with
each side. See Interview with John W. Salmon, Miami mediator, in Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.
(March 13, 1996).
118. Hall, supra note 105, at 299-300.
119. Id. at 298-99.
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over a period of two years.120 The parties signed a handwritten
agreement on the spot and the attorneys agreed that the defendant’s
lawyer would draft a final agreement.121
This case demonstrates many features that disturb some people
about a directive style of mediation. When judges make “sugges-
tions,” attorneys and principals often feel strongly pressured to ac-
cept the suggestions, even if the judges do not intend to limit the
litigants’ choices. The attorneys and principals may experience extra
pressure when approached by a private-sector (“third-party”) ADR
provider who conveys the judge’s suggestion and offers to mediate.
When he entered the case, the third party already had significant in-
formation about the case and had developed ideas about what the ul-
timate result should be. He purposely used a variety of strong moves
to push the participants toward his conception of the appropriate re-
sult. Although he certainly listened to the participants, his extensive
use of caucusing limited the amount that the participants could
communicate directly with each other. This procedure gave the third
party tremendous power to influence the participants through care-
ful characterization of the other sides’ positions. The third party
joined forces (at least temporarily) with one attorney to pressure the
attorney’s own client to take a more “reasonable” position. The third
party used the pressure of time to prod the principals, in this case by
continuing the process until the principals finally agreed. In addition
to these relatively indirect forms of pressure, the third party strongly
expressed his opinions, disparaged the participants’ positions, and
pressed hard for the participants to accept a particular agreement.
He apparently implied that if the defendant did not make what he
considered reasonable movement toward settlement, he (Green) might
so inform the judge. While this case may represent an extreme on the
scale of directiveness, a directive style is not unusual.122 Researchers
Deborah Kolb and Kenneth Kressel find that many mediators exten-
sively use heavy-handed “pressure tactics and arm twisting.”123
The tactics that Green used were relatively overt. Mediators’
moves to influence the participants are often much more subtle than
                                                                                                                   
120. See id. at 300.
121. See id.
122. I use this case for illustration because it provides an especially detailed account
of directive mediation tactics. I do not intend to single out Professor Green for criticism
because he is, after all, a successful and respected mediator who uses techniques that are
quite common in some sectors. Although I criticize Green’s tactics in this case, I believe
there may be an appropriate place in the dispute resolution market for directive media-
tion under some conditions. It is not clear from the published account whether Green ac-
curately described to the principals the kind of pressure tactics that he would use and how
they compared with other mediation practices. If he did so, I would be less concerned
about his procedures. See supra note 79 and infra notes 173-74, 269 and accompanying
text.
123. Kolb & Kressel, supra note 13, at 461; see also id. at 479-83, 488.
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the ones that Green used. Professors David Greatbatch and Robert
Dingwall describe a process that they call “selective facilitation,”124 in
which the mediator directs the discussion toward some proposals
and away from others.125 Using sophisticated conversation analysis
techniques126 to analyze an audiotape of a mediation session, they
present a case in which a divorcing couple owns a family residence
(where the wife and the couple’s two young children were then liv-
ing) and a less valuable piece of rental property.127 The wife wanted
an agreement in which she would keep the family residence and the
husband would keep the rental property.128 The husband wanted to
sell both properties and divide the proceeds.129 A casual reading of
the transcript might give the impression that the mediator did not
favor either option, but a close examination reveals that the media-
tor subtly moved the process toward one option and away from the
other.130 The mediator never directly expressed an opinion about
these two options, but she repeatedly returned to the option of
keeping the properties; whenever the husband raised the sale option,
the mediator either raised questions about it or steered the conver-
sation back to the option of keeping the properties.131 Although the
couple did not reach agreement in mediation about the real estate,
the mediator apparently salvaged an agreement about support pay-
ments.132 Greatbatch and Dingwall report that the selective facilita-
tion in this case was not unusual among the forty-five mediation ses-
sions that they analyzed.133
For settlors,134 the mediation process in the two cases described in
this subpart are not very problematic because the mediators focused
intensely on trying to get an agreement. For those concerned about
values other than simply settlement, these cases may be quite trou-
bling. For example, if the plaintiff in Green’s case had second
thoughts in the following day or two and did not want to proceed
with the agreement, one might question the quality of his consent. In
the following subpart, we examine the legal standards of consent,
                                                                                                                   
124. David Greatbatch & Robert Dingwall, Selective Facilitation: Some Preliminary
Observations on a Strategy Used by Divorce Mediators, 23 L. & SOC’Y REV. 613, 613 (1989).
125. See id. at 618, 636-38.
126. Conversation analysis techniques provide much more detail than verbatim tran-
scripts prepared by court reporters. Conversation analysis transcripts display utterances,
pauses, voice inflections, and overlapping talk, thus providing a relatively complete depic-
tion of conversations. See id. at 619 n.7.
127. See id. at 618.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 619-35.
131. See id. at 636.
132. See id. at 634.
133. See id. at 617.
134. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
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which would almost certainly have been satisfied in this situation. In
Part III.C, I suggest some standards of what I call “high-quality con-
sent” under which there would be serious concerns about the quality
of the plaintiff’s consent.
B.   Standard of Legal Consent
To provide the legal context and a basis for comparison in defin-
ing the “high-quality consent” in mediation discussed in Part III.C, it
may be useful to consider the standard of consent that the courts use
in determining whether to enforce agreements, including agreements
settling disputes. In general, contract law has a low standard of con-
sent and recognizes only a few narrow exceptions.135 Contracts typi-
cally involve an exchange of promises in which a “promise is a mani-
festation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way,
so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commit-
ment has been made.”136 In assessing a “manifestation of intention,”
courts use “an external or objective standard for interpreting con-
duct; it means the external expression of intention as distinguished
from undisclosed intention. A promisor manifests an intention if he
believes or has reason to believe that the promisee will infer that in-
tention from his words or conduct.”137 Note that under the objective
standard, the courts generally do not analyze the care with which
the parties negotiated the agreement (e.g., the parties’ consideration
of various alternatives that they might have chosen or the likely con-
sequences of the various alternatives), the fairness of the agreement,
or even their actual understanding of the agreement.138 Although
there is a doctrinal exception for “unconscionable” agreements, as
most first-year law students know, that exception is quite limited.139
                                                                                                                   
135. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 12-19 (1981); see also infra notes
139-43 and accompanying text.
136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2(1).
137. Id. § 2(1) cmt. b.
138. See id. §§ 17-19. According to a comment in the Restatement:
Almost never are all the connotations of a bargain exactly identical for both
parties; it is enough that there is a core of common meaning sufficient to de-
termine their performances with reasonable certainty or to give a reasonably
certain basis for an appropriate legal remedy.
Id. § 20 cmt. b.
139. See id. § 208 cmt. d:
A bargain is not unconscionable merely because the parties to it are unequal
in bargaining position, nor even because the inequality results in an allocation
of risks to the weaker party. But gross inequality of bargaining power, to-
gether with terms unreasonably favorable to the stronger party, may confirm
indications that the transaction involved elements of deception or compulsion,
or may show that the weaker party had no meaningful choice, no real alterna-
tive, or did not in fact assent or appear to assent to the unfair terms.
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The other factors negating assent, including misrepresentation,140
duress,141 undue influence,142 and mistake,143 are also fairly narrow.
As a matter of legal policy, using such an inclusive, (fairly) bright
line approach seems prudent considering the courts’ difficult role in
adjudicating contentious disputes and the possible result that some
parties will act more carefully knowing that they cannot easily evade
the consequences. On the other hand, by definition, the law per-
mits—and thus, perhaps, encourages—sharp practices that almost,
but do not quite, run afoul of the law.144 Thus, while contract doctrine
regarding the required level of consent may produce good results in
the adjudication context, considering the shadow that the law casts
on negotiation, it may be counterproductive or at least suboptimal in
its effect on negotiation.145
The fact that the law tolerates unsavory negotiation practices is
one reason that many people are interested in ways to improve the
negotiation process. This concern reflects an intrinsic value in the
disputing process itself, independent of the merits of the outcome or
even the principals’ satisfaction. For example, there might be a
broad consensus of experts on divorce that, under the circumstances,
the retention of the family residence in Greatbatch and Dingwall’s
case would be in the best interests of the children and perhaps the
family as a whole, especially if that option had been developed so
that the father’s interests could also have been addressed.146 Simi-
larly, in Eric Green’s case, the terms of the agreement that Green
engineered might be quite appropriate under applicable legal or
other norms.147 Moreover, if one interviewed the participants after
the mediations in these cases, the participants might feel quite satis-
fied with both the outcome and the process, particularly considering
the legitimate values of being heard by a formally neutral third
party, gaining resolution, and banishing fears of litigation.148 Even
                                                                                                                   
140. See id. §§ 159-73.
141. See id. §§ 174-75.
142. See id. §§ 176-77.
143. See id. §§ 151-58.
144. See, e.g., ROBERT J. RINGER, WINNING THROUGH INTIMIDATION (1978).
145. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 980 (1979). “[A] standard may have good
characteristics as a background rule for private ordering but may nevertheless be unac-
ceptable as a standard for adjudicating disputed cases.” Id. The converse is true as well.
Professors Mnookin and Kornhauser show that the “best interests of the child standard”
for determining child custody may produce good results in adjudication, but creates per-
verse incentives in negotiation. Id. at 977-79.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 126-33.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 120-21.
148. Some commentators correctly point out that the termination of some cases does
not necessarily completely resolve a conflict or even avoid future litigation. See Bush, Ju-
risdictional Principles for Process Choice, supra note 85, at 907 n.26. Nonetheless, settle-
ment often does result in resolution, which is something that people may legitimately value.
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so, many observers may not be satisfied, believing that the processes
were inappropriate or did not realize their potential.149 If the legal
standards of consent do not provide adequate guidance for deter-
mining an appropriate or desirable quality of consent for an agree-
ment in mediation,150 we should consider other standards for evalu-
ating consent, which we will examine in the next subpart.
C.   Indicators for a Continuum of High-Quality Consent
If a mere objective “manifestation of mutual assent”151 is not
enough to establish what one might consider high-quality consent,
what is? This is obviously a difficult question to answer, and the fol-
lowing is the best that I have developed so far. I will use the term
“high-quality consent” to refer to a condition in which a principal has
exercised his or her responsibility152 for making decisions in a dis-
pute by considering the situation sufficiently and without excessive
pressure. Like many definitions, this relies on important terms (“suf-
ficiently” and “excessive”) that are very ambiguous. In this subpart, I
will suggest seven factors that may make this concept more concrete
(though these factors admittedly entail some subjective judgment).
These factors are intended to provide principals, their attorneys,
mediators, or other observers with practical criteria for determining
the quality level of consent of a principal in mediation.
This task is more difficult than it might appear for at least three
reasons. First, as we shall see, the goal of high-quality consent is an
ideal that is not completely achievable in practice. To produce the
highest possible quality of consent would require more time and
money than normally would be justified. Thus, the quality of consent
to be obtained must be balanced with the value of resources to be
committed and other criteria for evaluation.153 Second, mediation
                                                                                                                   
149. As described below, although I am critical of directive mediation styles involving
substantial mediator pressure, I would be satisfied if principals chose such an approach
after receiving a clear description of the procedures that are likely to be used. See infra
notes 173-74, 269 and accompanying text; see also supra note 79.
150. Craig McEwen raised an important question about whether agreements reached
in mediated negotiations should be judged by a higher standard than those reached in
unmediated negotiations. See Telephone Interview with Craig McEwen, Daniel B. Fayer-
weather Professor of Political Economy and Sociology, Bowdoin College (Oct. 24, 1996).
This is a large and important question beyond the scope of this Article.
151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (1981).
152.  I use the term “responsibility” to refer to both authority and accountability. By
definition, the principals are the ones who are authorized to make the ultimate decisions
in a dispute. The concept of accountability is clearest for representatives of organizations,
such as executives and claims adjusters, who are accountable to others in their organiza-
tions. Principals acting solely as individuals are accountable to their own self-judgment,
and they must live with the consequences of their decisions.
153. See infra notes 162-87 and accompanying text. I am grateful to Jim Boskey for
highlighting the costs of producing high-quality consent.
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processes are not single, discrete events, but are processes unfolding
over time that may have more or fewer characteristics of high-
quality consent at different points during the process. Finally, be-
cause the behaviors fostering (and impeding) the principals’ delib-
eration and the application of pressure are subtle, proper analysis
depends on the context.154
The following list reflects my working hypotheses about factors af-
fecting the quality of principals’ decisionmaking. These suggestions
are necessarily tentative and subject to revision depending on their
usefulness in clinical practice and empirical research. The descriptions
incorporate my own views about some controversial issues; I am hope-
ful that this discussion will contribute to some clarification of the is-
sues, if not an eventual general consensus.155 The factors include: (1)
explicit identification of the principals’ goals and interests, (2) explicit
identification of plausible options for satisfying these interests, (3) the
principals’ explicit selection of options for evaluation, (4) careful con-
sideration of these options, (5) mediators’ restraint in pressuring prin-
cipals to accept particular substantive options, (6) limitation on use of
time pressure, and (7) confirmation of principals’ consent to selected
options.156 I describe each of these factors below.
Note that these factors are suggested as possible indicators in a
continuum of the quality of consent, not as necessary ethical or legal
requirements in every situation.157 This set of factors is intended to
suggest some possible “best-practice” guidelines oriented to enhanc-
ing the quality of principals’ consent. The fact that a mediation does
not fully follow all of these guidelines does not necessarily suggest
that there is anything wrong with the mediation, only that it does
not fully achieve an aspirational standard on one (and, I would ar-
gue, important) dimension of mediation. Unlike the legal test for
fraud, in which the absence of any element negates the existence of
fraud,158 these factors are suggestive, and not every factor is essen-
                                                                                                                   
154. See Riskin, supra note 9, at 38 n.98.
155. For another effort to identify critical elements in empowerment-style mediation,
see Folger & Bush, Ten Hallmarks, supra note 85. Folger and Bush’s list of factors over-
laps with mine in focusing on principals’ decisionmaking responsibility, thorough consid-
eration of issues, and avoidance of mediator pressure. Their list seems oriented to pro-
viding tactical advice to mediators and thus contains some specific prescriptions that
might be included in some of my more general factors.
156. Because this scale is intended to reflect the quality of principals’ consent, these
factors focus primarily on the quality of the decisionmaking process, though the factors
involving selection and evaluation of options do require careful analysis of potential out-
comes by the principals. Evaluation of results by such criteria as fairness and efficiency is
also important, but beyond the scope of this Article.
157. Cf. Moberly, supra note 65 (arguing that although evaluative methods present
potential dangers, they are not unethical per se).
158. Lawsuits based on fraud sometimes refer to “deceit.” The following is a recitation
of the elements required for this cause of action:
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tial. This is more like the test for a type of undue influence, referred
to as “overpersuasion” in a line of California cases:
[O]verpersuasion is generally accompanied by certain characteris-
tic elements which, when simultaneously present in a significant
number, characterize the persuasion as excessive. These elements
are “(1) discussion of the transaction at an unusual or inappropri-
ate time, (2) consummation of the transaction in an unusual place,
(3) insistent demand that the business be finished at once, (4) ex-
treme emphasis on untoward consequences of delay, (5) the use of
multiple persuaders by the dominant side against a single servient
party, (6) absence of third-party advisers to the servient party, (7)
statements that there is no time to consult financial advisers or at-
torneys.”159
For example, in a case in which a police officer was pressured to re-
sign by a deputy police chief soon after the officer had been charged
with rape, the court upheld a civil service board’s decision setting
aside the resignation, finding that the evidence could support five of
the seven factors of overpersuasion.160
Just as the preceding seven factors can be assessed to create an
implicit scale of overpersuasion, the seven factors I propose may be
used to form a continuum of quality of consent in mediation. Thus,
rather than indicating distinctly whether a principal has or has not
given high-quality consent in a particular situation, one might say
that the quality is better or worse considering all of these factors and
then judge whether the quality of consent is “enough.” Given the dif-
ficulty in defining this subjective concept, there can be obvious dif-
ferences of opinion over how much is enough (or how much is appro-
                                                                                                                   
The essential elements required to sustain an action for deceit are, generally
speaking, that a representation was made as a statement of fact, which was
untrue and known to be untrue by the party making it, or else recklessly
made; that it was made with intent to deceive and for the purpose of inducing
the other party to act upon it; and that he did in fact rely on it and was in-
duced thereby to act to his injury or damage. The representation must have
been made to him either directly or indirectly, and must have been of such a
nature that it was reasonably calculated to deceive him and to induce him to
do that which otherwise he would not have done. Generally, all of these ingre-
dients, except for a few variants from the common-law rules in force in some
American jurisdictions, must be found to exist, and the absence of any one of
them is fatal to a recovery . . . .
37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 12 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
159. Keithley v. Civil Serv. Bd., 89 Cal. Rptr. 809, 815 (Ct. App. 1970) (citation
omitted). These behaviors have an eerie resemblance to the more directive style of me-
diation, especially with the use of multiple persuaders. Although principals in media-
tion often have their lawyers present, they may sometimes feel that their own lawyers
have “turned on them,” joining with the opposing side and the mediator in urging them
to become “more reasonable.” See supra note 107; see also infra text accompanying
notes 214-15, 224.
160. See Keithley, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 815; see also generally 1 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW, Contracts § 428 (9th ed. 1995).
1997]                         LAWYERING AND MEDIATION 871
priate considering other values such as efficiency and termination of
a dispute). Indeed, this is probably the heart of the difference be-
tween settlors and empowerors.161 Defining the quality of consent as
a continuum using fairly concrete behavioral indicators such as the
following could help clarify such debates.
1.   Explicit Consideration of Principals’ Goals and Interests
It may seem obvious that it would be important for principals to
identify their goals for resolving a dispute and the interests under-
lying their goals. Yet many mediators, lawyers, and principals often
assume—incorrectly—that they know the goals and interests of the
principals and that explicit discussion of these matters is thus un-
necessary. No doubt many mediators and lawyers often assume that
the principals simply want to end up with “more” of whatever they
want, and that they usually just want more money. The principals
may make similar assumptions about each other. Moreover, the
principals and lawyers may enter mediation so fixated on obtaining
particular outcomes that they do not consider what the principals’
basic interests are that may be achieved with outcomes they had not
considered. In terms of Leonard Riskin’s typology, eliciting higher
quality consent entails defining the problem broadly rather than
narrowly.162 Riskin identifies four progressively broader levels of in-
terests, which he calls litigation issues, business interests, per-
sonal/professional/relational interests, and community interests.163
Clearly, to obtain high-quality consent, one need not necessarily ex-
pand the definition of a dispute to encompass all possible interests
and issues. Rather, enhancing the quality of consent entails explora-
tion of the principals’ goals and interests to an appropriate extent
under the circumstances. Eliciting interests explicitly increases the
likelihood that principals will identify their interests.164 As noted
above, these interventions are not suggested as being necessary or
appropriate in every case, and thus there are undoubtedly situations
in which mediators quite wisely refrain from exploring all the inter-
ests.
                                                                                                                   
161. See supra notes 48-50, 58-60 and accompanying text.
162. See Riskin, supra note 9, at 18-23; see also FISHER ET AL., supra note 14, at 40-55
(advising parties to identify interests underlying their positions); BUSH & FOLGER, supra
note 10, at 85 (advocating empowerment by identifying goals); Menkel-Meadow, Toward
Another View of Legal Negotiation, supra note 12, at 794-829 (proposing model of problem-
solving negotiation meeting parties’ underlying needs).
163. See Riskin, supra note 9, at 18-23.
164. Many of the factors I suggest entail an element of explicitness. I am grateful to
Mill Valley, California, mediator and trainer Gary Friedman for highlighting this value.
This may be useful to assure that the matter is indeed dealt with and to minimize confu-
sion.
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2.   Explicit Identification of Plausible Options
To make an informed decision, it seems obvious that it is neces-
sary to identify various plausible options165 for resolving an issue. In
some cases, the discussion focuses on a single option, such as the
first one suggested by a principal or thought of by the mediator.
Moreover, mediators sometimes do not use a problem-solving ap-
proach seeking to develop options benefiting all principals,166 which
is a major potential benefit of mediation processes. The quality of
principals’ consent is diminished to the extent that there are serious
plausible options that the participants do not identify. I believe that
it can be quite appropriate for mediators to identify plausible options
that the participants have not thought of and that, if done properly,
this enhances rather than detracts from the quality of principals’
consent.167
We should not underestimate the difficulty of routinely identify-
ing a wide range of plausible options. This demands a significant
amount of time and emotional commitment, especially if the partici-
pants enter the process with strong commitments to a positional ap-
proach in which the participants make a series of counteroffers to
                                                                                                                   
165. Some people advocate the use of brainstorming processes in which the partici-
pants are encouraged to suggest many different options, often including outrageous op-
tions, as a spur to creative thinking. See FISHER ET AL., supra note 14, at 60-70. While it
can be a very useful technique to encourage people to suggest even silly options, this is not
necessary for informed decisionmaking. The fact that one can almost always suggest a vir-
tually infinite number of implausible options indicates that one need not consider all op-
tions to make informed judgments. Indeed, even limiting discussion to all plausible op-
tions may be impractical because there may be a virtually infinite number of plausible op-
tions in some situations, as when the issue is about allocation of a continuous commodity
like money. If P demands $100,000 and D offers $10,000, there are at least 90,000 plausi-
ble options. Here, consideration of all plausible options would not entail explicit considera-
tion of every single intermediate amount, but rather examination of the different princi-
ples on which the principals may base their decision of which amount to select. In addi-
tion, plausible options may include nonmonetary solutions, options based on linkages be-
tween issues, and possible contributions of parties not “at the table.”
166. See supra note 49.
167. Some people would argue that it is inappropriate for mediators to suggest options
because they believe this would undermine the principals’ self-determination. I have fre-
quently heard mediators say that it would be inappropriate to suggest options because it
would unduly influence the parties or inevitably favor one party over another. I am con-
cerned about mediators favoring some options over others, but I do not believe that me-
diator suggestions necessarily pressure principals excessively, which I believe depends on
such things as the substantive balance, timing, and tone of mediators’ suggestions. Thus, I
would focus directly on the nature and effect of mediator efforts at influence rather than
make the categorical assumption that mediator suggestions have adverse effects. Media-
tors who criticize directly suggesting options sometimes recommend that mediators can
avoid (at least the appearance of) bias or pressure on parties by asking questions rather
than making declarative suggestions. This formula seems wholly inadequate because, de-
pending on the tone and context, some questions (e.g., “How greedy can you get?”) can exert
more pressure than declarative suggestions. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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narrow and ultimately eliminate their differences.168 In a given case,
there may be multiple issues and subissues; theoretically, mediation
processes should entail explicit identification of plausible options for
all the issues. Even though this is an important ideal, it may be
practically impossible to realize fully. Thus, one may judge media-
tion processes by the extent to which the mediators do promote ex-
plicit identification of plausible options, especially for the most im-
portant issues. In some situations, such as where the stakes are
relatively small or the principals are quite familiar with the circum-
stances, principals may intelligently decide to restrict the considera-
tion of options. In such situations, mediators oriented to eliciting
high-quality consent can explicitly check if the principals want to
consider additional options.169
3.   Principals’ Explicit Choice of Options for Consideration
The third factor involves the principals explicitly choosing to con-
sider the most plausible options. This factor is an extension of the
preceding ones and is subject to similar limitations. As a practical
matter, it is typically impossible or undesirable to fully evaluate the
complete range of plausible options for each issue. Thus, some
choices must be made to restrict the range of options and extent of
evaluation. This factor involves mediators helping the principals to
make these decisions consciously. Moreover, it encompasses an ele-
ment of impartiality by which mediators do not implicitly or explic-
itly steer the principals to focus on one option over another without
their consent. In this respect, the selective facilitation performed by
Greatbatch and Dingwall’s mediators170 and the pressure tactics that
Eric Green used171 reduce the quality of the principals’ consent.
Normally, mediators do not threaten the quality of the principals’
consent if the mediators do not press for consideration of particular op-
tions (at least if no side is taking inappropriate advantage over an-
other). While this may reflect an ideal approach, I believe that it is of-
ten helpful for mediators to suggest that the principals focus on cer-
tain options for evaluation. In my view, this does not undermine the
quality of the principals’ consent if mediators do so explicitly and with
limited pressure on the principals to accept the mediators’ suggestions.
4.   Careful Consideration of Options
To produce high-quality consent, the principals, after identifying
plausible options, should decide what information they need to
                                                                                                                   
168. See supra note 49.
169. I am grateful to Professor Fran Tetunic for suggesting this point.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 124-33.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 110-14.
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evaluate the options and then weigh the likely favorable and unfa-
vorable consequences. Clearly, the expected transaction costs of
various options (e.g., settlement versus trial) are important subjects
that should be considered. To enhance the quality of the principals’
consent, mediators would elicit realistic (rather than unreasonably
understated or exaggerated) estimates of the likely costs and conse-
quences of trial. In cases pending in litigation, mediators may be es-
pecially prone to describing how judges (either generally or the par-
ticular judge sitting on the case) and juries “typically” decide cases
like their case. Sometimes mediators portray litigation as almost
completely negative and exaggerate the risks of litigation as a means
of pressing the principals to settle. Clearly, this diminishes the
quality of their consent.
Some advocates of empowerment argue that mediators should not
express opinions about the substantive issues because doing so in-
evitably favors one side or another and excessively pressures the
principals.172 While this may often be the result, I do not believe that
a mediator’s expression of opinion necessarily reduces the quality of
the principal’s consent (or the mediator’s impartiality). For example,
a mediator may present opinions about likely court results or typical
resolutions in similar disputes without undermining the quality of
principals’ consent if the mediator first asks if the principals would
like the mediator’s opinion and, if so, presents this information with-
out excessively pressing the principals to accept a particular op-
tion.173 This risk can be further reduced if the mediator takes actions
to promote high-quality consent, such as explicitly facilitating con-
sideration of several options. This analysis suggests that mediators’
expression of opinions (and, as discussed above, identification and
selection of options for consideration) do not necessarily impair the
quality of the principals’ consent, but rather should be evaluated to
determine the extent to which these practices in fact pressure the
principals and whether the pressure is excessive.174
                                                                                                                   
172. See Kovach & Love, supra note 9, at 31-32.
173. See Marjorie Corman Aaron, ADR Toolbox: The Highwire Art of Evaluation, 14
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 62, 63 (1996); Laurence D. Connor, How to Combine
Facilitation with Evaluation, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 15, 15 (1996) (con-
cluding that innovative procedure is appropriate only by consent of principals).
174. Some advocates of empowerment question the need for mediators to express
opinions, arguing that the principals’ lawyers or other experts retained by the principals
can provide this information. See, e.g., Kovach & Love, supra note 9, at 31. While this
strategy may address the principals’ needs in some cases, some principals may feel un-
satisfied with this. Lawyers (and other professionals retained by one side in a dispute)
have their own perspectives and interests that are not always congruent with those of
their clients. Lawyers may take strong positions as a natural part of their role as advo-
cates or simply to maintain the clients’ confidence. On the other hand, clients are often
aware that their lawyers may be more inclined to settle than the clients, raising doubts
about the opinions expressed by the lawyers. See AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM L.F.
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The impact of a dispute on the principals’ relationships should of-
ten be an important consideration. Disputes don’t happen in a vac-
uum. They happen in a web of relationships that give meaning to
people’s lives. Often, disputes arise out of problems in a relationship.
In fact, considerations about the continuation of the relationship be-
tween the principals may be more important than the subject of the
dispute itself.175 Disputes may implicate a range of relationships be-
tween the principals and others who are not formally part of the dis-
pute, if only because the principals may provide accounts of the dis-
pute to relatives, friends, and other associates.176 Important relation-
ships are involved even in the stereotypical automobile negligence
case in which the plaintiff has no prior relationship nor expected fu-
ture relationship with the insurance company or its insured. Simply
maintaining a dispute requires the principals to continue a set of
relationships, albeit ones that are usually temporary and undesired.
Often, incidents in the conduct of a dispute overshadow the event or
transaction precipitating the dispute.177 Given the importance of re-
lationships to most people and the fact that relationship issues can
easily be overlooked in the course of fighting over the “substance” of
a dispute, mediators can increase the quality of principals’ consent
by focusing on the significance of relationships in the dispute.178 This
                                                                                                                   
FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR CLIENTS: POWER AND MEANING IN THE LEGAL
PROCESS 108-41 (1995). Although principals sometimes jointly hire third-party experts
(such as appraisers) to provide impartial opinions, this approach presents financial and
practical problems in many cases. Thus, some principals may especially value their me-
diators’ perspectives, particularly if the principals have confidence in the mediators’ integ-
rity and impartiality. See Riskin, supra note 9, at 38 n.98.
175. The general counsel of a large conglomerate described the importance of relation-
ships in many of the firm’s disputes:
[M]any of our businesses, for example, are with an industry in which it’s pri-
marily a customer-dominated market. In other words, if I have a dispute with
a car company, or if I have a dispute with [names of companies], . . . the over-
riding consideration is the long-term relationship. Whether we win, lose, or
draw, the economics, how strong our case is—none of that matters.
Lande, supra note 8, at 121.
176. See Herbert Jacob, The Elusive Shadow of the Law, 26 L. & SOC’Y REV. 565, 571,
581-83 (1992) (observing that whether divorcing parties got information about the law
from personal network of relatives, friends, co-workers, and acquaintances affected how
the parties defined the issues).
177. Someone told me of a case in which his mother was the plaintiff in a personal in-
jury suit. According to the story, the insurance company offered more than the plaintiff
had decided that she needed to settle. During the negotiations, however, the insurance
adjuster implied that the plaintiff was partially at fault for the incident, and the plaintiff
refused to accept the offer until the adjuster apologized for the statement. I don’t know
how accurate this particular story is, but it illustrates a common dynamic in which the
initial dispute triggers other disputes about the conduct of the dispute. When attorneys
are involved, sometimes the attorneys “go at it,” thus multiplying the number of things
that the principals may be angry about in the dispute.
178. This is different from Bush and Folger’s concept of “recognition,” by which they
refer to empathy for and acknowledgment of others’ problems. See BUSH & FOLGER, supra
note 10, at 2. I believe that recognition can be a very important goal and benefit of media-
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factor does not necessarily require lengthy discussion of any par-
ticular relationships, but only a sensitivity to the significance of rela-
tionships and a willingness to raise relationship issues when it ap-
pears that they are or might be important to the principals.
5.   Mediators’ Restraint in Pressuring Principals to Select
Particular Options
The choice of substantive options (e.g., whether to agree on x dol-
lars or y dollars or not to agree at all) is the ultimate decision that
principals must make in mediation and may be the most common
subject of mediator pressure. Clearly, mediators reduce the quality
of principals’ consent when the mediators effectively pressure prin-
cipals to substitute the mediator’s judgment for their own judgment,
as exemplified by the actions Eric Green took in the case described
above.179 Probably more common, mediators offer their opinions
about the merits of a case without expressly urging the principals to
take a particular position. Expression of such opinions does not nec-
essarily result in excessive pressure and may be quite appropriate in
certain situations. In some situations, however, it creates a risk of
reducing the quality of principals’ consent, especially if the mediator
                                                                                                                   
tion. Like Bush and Folger, I distinguish it from some concept of empowerment. In this
analysis, consideration of relationships is an element of high-quality consent because of
the important meanings that principals derive from individuals’ relationships. Focusing
on emotional and relationship issues is an especially important potential benefit of media-
tion, considering that many lawyers feel ill-equipped to deal with such issues. See SARAT
& FELSTINER, supra note 174, at 42-52, 128-33.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 109-14. One reviewer thought that I was too
critical of Eric Green’s techniques. The reviewer noted that many mediation authorities
recognize a legitimate role of a mediator as an “agent of reality,” and that many of Green’s
statements are about his perception of reality. Indeed, one of the techniques that I advo-
cate is promotion of careful consideration of options. See supra text accompanying notes
165-78. Nonetheless, I have always been uncomfortable with the agent-of-reality concept
because some mediators interpret this as a warrant establishing that mediators necessar-
ily have superior knowledge of reality than the participants do. Though mediators often do
have a privileged perspective (especially if they caucus extensively so that the mediators
have more current information than any of the participants), the agency-of-reality claim is
sometimes made to privilege the mediators’ personal opinions, advice, and overly confi-
dent predictions. As the reviewer noted, agent-of-reality techniques are dangerous if the
mediators give false impressions of what would happen in the absence of agreement, or if
they make a participant feel so uncomfortable about the mediators’ behavior (rather than
the underlying reality of the situation) that the participant makes decisions primarily to
reduce that discomfort.
While the participation of experienced attorneys may, as one reviewer suggested, miti-
gate harmful effects of mediators’ pressure techniques, these techniques are especially
risky if a principal is unrepresented or represented by incompetent counsel. Should the
standard be that pressure tactics do not diminish the quality of consent if the mediators
can assure that the principals are represented by (equally) competent counsel? Not as far
as I am concerned. The critical distinction is whether the reality testing is primarily de-
signed to help the principals better exercise their own judgment or to inhibit principals
from doing so by pressuring them to accept the mediators’ preferred options. Based on the
published account of Green’s case, his actions fall clearly in the latter category.
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effectively urges the principals to accept a position expressed by the
mediator or described as normal. This is especially dangerous if the
mediator suggests that refusal to accept the mediator’s position
might result in some sanction, such as a report to the court that one
side was responsible for unreasonably failing to settle. An actual or
implied threat to withdraw the mediator’s respect and cooperation is
probably a more typical and more potent sanction.
Probably the greatest pressure that mediators exert is the pres-
sure to reach settlement for the sake of settlement, based on the as-
sumption that settling in mediation is almost always better than not
settling. Deciding whether or not to settle is the ultimate decision
that principals make in mediation. The right to trial is a precious
value protected under the federal and state constitutions.180 Princi-
pals may legitimately decide to take advantage of this right. If they
are to enhance the quality of principals’ decisionmaking, mediators,
after discussing the principals’ analysis of the dispute as described
above, must respect principals’ decisions not to settle if they so
choose.
6.   Limitation on Use of Time Pressure
Time pressure can impair people’s judgment and can be used to
reduce the quality of principals’ consent. Time pressure often results
from an apparent need to make a decision within a short time,
though it also may result from efforts to prolong a dispute, as we saw
in Eric Green’s case.181 In some cases, time pressure results from ex-
ternal constraints that may be difficult or impossible to change, such
as a trial date or a relevant external transaction. In such situations,
mediators help participants by periodically focusing attention on
those time constraints and helping principals to exercise decision-
making responsibility as well as possible within those constraints.
Indeed, mediators may provide a valuable service by eliciting agree-
ments about the pace of the process and any deadlines that the prin-
cipals may want to set.
In some situations, the mediator or a participant in a mediation
may manipulate time constraints to pressure some participants. De-
pending on the circumstances, this may inappropriately reduce the
quality of principals’ consent, especially if the mediator initiates the
time pressure. Inappropriate time pressure is a serious risk in me-
diation when there is an unnecessary expectation that the principals
can reach and sign an agreement during a single-session mediation
without further opportunity for advice, reflection, or negotiation.
Thus, mediators can enhance the quality of principals’ consent by
                                                                                                                   
180. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see also, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 22.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 115-18.
878 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:839
being genuinely open to continuing a mediation at a later time as
appropriate. Mediators can enhance the quality of principals’ con-
sent by suggesting that principals take a reasonable amount of time,
such as several days, to consider a proposed agreement before being
expected to commit to it.182
7.   Confirmation of Consent
When principals are on the verge of reaching an agreement, me-
diators can ensure that principals’ decisionmaking responsibility is
honored by checking whether the principals understand the pro-
posed agreement, need further information, and want to proceed
with the agreement. Of course, this would not be effective if the me-
diators appear to simply “go through the motions,” as some courts do
when accepting plea bargains.183 Rather, mediators oriented to en-
suring principals’ high-quality consent would make a serious in-
quiry, especially if a principal seemed uncertain or ambivalent. This
is especially important in one-session mediations in which the me-
diator drafts an agreement that the principals are expected to sign
at that session. Although the participation of the principals’ lawyers
in mediation may provide some assurance of high-quality consent, if
the lawyers are strongly motivated to reach some settlement in the
mediation, their presence may undermine rather than support the
principals’ decisionmaking responsibility, as described below.184
As noted above, I hypothesize that cumulatively these seven fac-
tors are good indicators of the extent to which a mediation process
enhances or diminishes the quality of the principals’ consent, which
is an intrinsic potential benefit of the process. For several reasons,
the development of a fairly clear and generally accepted conception
of high-quality consent may be an important influence in the devel-
                                                                                                                   
182. Cf. 16 C.F.R. § 429.1 (1997) (Federal Trade Commission rule defining as unfair
and deceptive act in which door-to-door seller fails to provide buyer with notice of right to
cancel sale within three days of sale). I am grateful to Berkeley, California, mediator Ron
Kelly for persistently emphasizing this point.
183. In criminal cases, defendants who plead guilty typically must go through a “cop-
out” ceremony in court where the
accused not only is made to assert publicly his guilt of a specific crime, but also
a complete recital of its details. He is further made to indicate that he is en-
tering his plea of guilt freely, willingly, and voluntarily, and that he is not do-
ing so because of any promises or in consideration of any commitments that
may have been made to him by anyone.
Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as Confidence Game: Organizational Coopta-
tion of a Profession, L. & SOC’Y REV., June 1967, at 15, 32. This process is obviously a cha-
rade in many cases and virtually everyone involved knows it. Despite the guilty pleas and
affirmations of voluntariness, Blumberg, in a random survey of 724 defendants, found
that in presentence probation interviews following their guilty pleas, more than half the
defendants claimed to be innocent. See id.
184. See infra notes 214-16, 223-25, 236 and accompanying text.
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opment of both lawyering practices and mediation practices in the
next century. First, mediators’ philosophies about principals’ respon-
sibility in mediation may be an important distinguishing feature in
the mediation marketplace.185 If so, it will be vital for mediators to
develop and project their own identities along this dimension in the
market.186 By the same token, to serve their clients profitably, law-
yers, as regular buyers of mediation services, will need to recognize
these key distinctions between mediators. Second, and more impor-
tant, this issue may shape actual lawyering and mediation practices,
as we consider in the next Part of this Article. These factors may
provide useful guidelines for mediators, lawyers, and principals who
champion values of empowerment. In addition, the behavioral fac-
tors comprising the scale suggest specific procedures that mediators
of all persuasions, including dyed-in-the-wool settlors,187 can readily
include in their mediation practices without necessarily “buying the
whole program.” By the same token, lawyers who generally prefer
settlor-style mediation may identify certain procedures that they
might request to enhance their clients’ interests without jeopardiz-
ing their goals of definite and efficient dispute resolution. We now
consider how these and related issues will affect lawyers’ and media-
tors’ practices.
IV.   POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF LAWYER PARTICIPATION IN LITI-
MEDIATION
As mediation becomes a routine step in contested litigation,188 we
can expect that mediation and litigation procedures will co-evolve,
i.e., the dynamics of litigation will influence the practice of mediation
and vice versa.189 Some obvious possibilities are that routine use of
mediation in litigation could reduce the level of adversarial behavior
in litigation generally,190 and the incorporation of mediation into the
                                                                                                                   
185. See supra Part II.
186. See Lande, supra note 74, at 41-45.
187. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 8, 23 and accompanying text (discussing development of “liti-
mediation” culture).
189. Co-evolution is a process of mutual adaptation of different interdependent enti-
ties in which the development of each entity affects the other(s). See Suchman, supra note
30, at 321-24. “Various entities pivot around each other towards a stable but initially inde-
terminate end-state, creating their environment collectively, rather than adjusting to it
individually.” Id. at 321.
190. See Craig A. McEwen et al., Lawyers, Mediation, and the Management of Divorce
Practice, 28 L. & SOC’Y REV. 149, 178-81 (1994). Professors Craig McEwen, Lynn Mather,
and Richard Maiman conducted a compelling study comparing divorce practice in Maine,
where there is a mandatory divorce mediation scheme, and in New Hampshire, where
there is not such a scheme. Based on interviews with 163 lawyers, they found that Maine
lawyers typically acted reasonably in mediation and that the lawyers had less adversarial
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litigation process could increase the level of adversarialness in me-
diation.191 This Part examines some possible and, indeed, likely
changes as these two forms of practice evolve in tandem, particularly
as lawyers routinely shop, plan for, attend, and participate in media-
tion. Although principals are not always represented by attorneys
and attorneys do not always attend mediations, attorneys often do
attend and participate actively in liti-mediation environments.192
Part IV.A focuses on how routine participation of lawyers in media-
tion is likely to result in ongoing relationships between mediators
and lawyers that may overshadow their respective relationships
with the principals. Part IV.A also describes how lawyers’ participa-
tion may induce mediators to focus on lawyers’ interests in pressing
the principals into settlement and inhibit mediators from independ-
ently managing the process. In addition, lawyers’ participation may
significantly affect the timing of the mediation process, as described
in Part IV.B. In liti-mediation cultures, the scheduling of mediation
is likely to be determined by local norms about whether it is most
appropriate at early, intermediate, or late stages of pretrial litiga-
tion. Part IV.B also describes how the mediation process may be
rushed as it is oriented toward the time frame of litigation and limi-
tations of lawyers’ time. Part IV.C analyzes how an orientation of
mediation toward the needs of lawyers and courts may enhance or
undermine the principals’ ability to exercise their decisionmaking
responsibility. Lawyers’ norms of adversarial bargaining and “client
control” may be incorporated into mediation. This may have an espe-
cially powerful effect given the time pressures described in Part
IV.B. Despite many lawyers’ interest in using a problem-solving ap-
proach that enhances the exercise of the clients’ decisionmaking re-
sponsibility, Part IV.C contends that the lawyers’ very participation
in mediation may undermine those possibilities if the lawyers bring
adversarial approaches into mediation that reduce the quality of the
principals’ quality consent to settlement.193
                                                                                                                   
attitudes and behaviors than their counterparts in New Hampshire. See id.; see also
McEwen et al., supra note 23, at 1367-68.
191. McEwen and his colleagues reported that the mandatory mediation in Maine did
not appear to spoil the mediation process or undermine real mediation. See McEwen et al.,
supra note 23, at 1371-73, 1392-94. While these problems may not have occurred in
Maine, I believe that without careful precautions, institutionalization of mediation may
entail substantial risks to principals, as described in this Part.
192. See infra note 205.
193. Craig McEwen correctly points out that in analyzing the effects of lawyer partici-
pation in mediation, rather than comparing this to a process in which the principals do
not retain lawyers at all, one should generally compare mediation processes in which law-
yers attend mediation sessions with mediation processes in which lawyers are retained by
the principals but do not attend mediation sessions. See McEwen, supra note 150. He sug-
gests that when the lawyers do not attend mediation sessions, they may nonetheless have
a major adverse effect if, for example, they give principals strict instructions about what
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A.   Relationships Between Principals, Lawyers, and Mediators
As mediation becomes more common, and especially where the
courts are authorized to order cases into mediation,194 most lawyers
will feel the need to be able to advise clients about the use of media-
tion, select appropriate mediators, and competently represent their
clients in mediation.195 Indeed, the institutionalization of mediation
may lead to establishment of an ethical duty to advise clients about
mediation and even malpractice liability for failing to do so.196 None-
theless, I suspect that informal social pressure and (actual or per-
ceived) court mandates will influence lawyers to routinely incorpo-
rate mediation into their practices much more than the threat of pro-
fessional discipline or liability. As lawyers perceive that participa-
tion in mediation is normal or even the “in thing,”197 they are likely
to take it for granted as a normal feature of the legal process.198
Institutionalization of mediation is likely to result in significant
redefinitions of the relationships between principals, lawyers, and
mediators. Over time, lawyers and mediators in the same profes-
sional community are likely to establish distinctive reputations and
ongoing relationships with each other.199 As the lawyers are likely to
                                                                                                                   
they should not agree to and then second-guess agreements reached in sessions in which
the lawyers did not participate. See id. While this certainly may be so, I believe that direct
lawyer participation in mediation brings the serious risks described in this Article, which
I suspect often exceed those that McEwen identifies. The issue deserves more analysis
than is possible within the scope of this Article.
194. See ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 3, app. B.
195. The McEwen et al. study of divorce mediation in Maine found that “having incor-
porated mediation into their practices, Maine divorce lawyers report that they typically
describe the process, seriously examine settlement options and approaches, and preach
mediation’s virtues to clients in preparing them to undertake the process.” McEwen et al.,
supra note 23, at 1385.
196. See Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Legal Representation and the Next Steps Toward Cli-
ent Control: Attorney Malpractice for the Failure to Allow the Client to Control Negotiation
and Pursue Alternatives to Litigation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 819 (1990); Frank E.A.
Sander, At Issue: Professional Responsibility, Should There Be a Duty to Advise of ADR
Options? Yes: An Aid to Clients, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1990, at 50, 50; ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra
note 3, § 4:03.
197. See Elizabeth D. Ellen, Attorneys and Court-Ordered Mediation: An Examination
of the Lawyer-Neutral (June 3, 1995) (paper presented at the Law and Society Association
Annual Meeting). Ellen conducted a study of mediators in North Carolina, where the me-
diated settlement conference statute was modeled on Florida’s mediation statute, par-
ticularly in its provisions governing certification and selection of mediators. Ellen found
that lawyer-mediators comprised an elite group in the bar as compared with the nonme-
diators. See id.
198. See McEwen et al., supra note 23, at 1385. McEwen and his colleagues found that
“[f]rom the perspective of clients, mediation in Maine simply appears as another step in
the divorce process” and that Maine lawyers typically view it the same way. Id.
199. As one indication of this, many mediators in Florida begin their “opening state-
ments” by telling the principals that the opening statement is directed to them (the prin-
cipals) because the lawyers have heard it many times. See, e.g., Videotape: Circuit Civil
Mediation with Martin I. Lipnak (on file with author).
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be repeat players,200 mediators may well see lawyers as their (the
mediators’) clients rather than the principals,201 with whom the me-
diators are much less likely to have repeat business. This alliance
between mediators and lawyers—and mediators’ great stake in their
goodwill with the lawyers in their community—is likely to be rein-
forced if the lawyers (rather than the principals) typically do the
shopping for mediators.202 When the lawyers in a case (or their major
clients) are roughly comparable in their repeat-player status, the
mediator would presumably be equally dependent on both lawyers
and would generally not have an incentive to favor one side or an-
other.203 When one side is a repeat player (such as an insurance
company or a lawyer who uses mediation frequently) and the other
side is not, the mediation process could consciously or unconsciously
be affected by an ongoing relationship between a mediator and a
lawyer.204
                                                                                                                   
200. See Galanter, supra note 30, at 114 (characterizing lawyers as quintessential re-
peat players).
201. For example, Eric Green identifies cases by the person who referred the case,
such as “Judge X’s case” or the “construction case from Attorney Y.” Hall, supra note 105,
at 283.
202. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text. It is true, as Greg Firestone cor-
rectly pointed out, that some attorneys may receive case referrals from mediators. Thus,
the influence is not entirely a “one-way street.” Nonetheless, I suspect that mediators are
generally more dependent on receiving referrals from lawyers than the other way around,
especially in liti-mediation environments where cases are ordered to mediation only after
the litigation (and often the legal representation) has begun.
203. Mediators do not have formal authority to impose an ultimate resolution in a
matter, and thus could not make a formal decision favoring one side or another. See, e.g.,
FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.050-.070. Nonetheless, mediators may help or
interfere with particular individuals’ efforts through the mediators’ control over the proc-
ess, including such decisions as what issues are worthy of discussion and what options are
suitable for serious consideration, and subtle or not-so-subtle expressions of opinion about
particular positions. See supra text accompanying notes 162-84.
204. A journalistic report highlighted risks of private ADR service providers regularly
relying on certain lawyers or principals for work as neutrals. See Richard C. Reuben, The
Dark Side of ADR, CAL. LAW., Feb. 1994, at 53. Although this account focused primarily
on adjudicatory ADR processes, the potential for abuse is similar with mediation, espe-
cially when the mediators use more directive techniques. See supra note 40. One attorney
complained about perceived bias of a private ADR organization because he was a “one-
shotter,” Galanter, supra note 30, at 97, in a proceeding with a repeat player before the
ADR organization:
“I realized the situation the minute I walked in the room,” says the attorney.
“There I was, a sole practitioner who may bring one case to JAMS [Judicial
Arbitration and Mediation Service] in a year, going up against an insurance
company that brings it thousands of cases every year.”
Reuben, supra, at 57. Clearly, from an account like this, one cannot tell whether the ADR
provider did or did not act improperly. However, this account highlights a serious poten-
tial problem. One attorney told me that he believes that insurance company claims adjusters
have significant input in the choice of specific mediators in their cases. Another attorney
summarized the problem in the following graphic and probably overstated quotation:
“Anytime you are paying someone by the hour to decide the rights and liabili-
ties of litigants, and that person is dependent for future business on main-
taining good will with those who will bring him business, you’ve got a system
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Local norms about whether lawyers normally attend mediation
sessions and, if so, how they participate may radically affect the con-
stellation of relationships and the dynamics of the process. In some
places, lawyers routinely attend mediation sessions;205 in other
places, lawyers rarely attend.206 If lawyers do attend the mediation,
they may affect the process dramatically. In some situations, the
lawyers take a dominant role in which they do most of the talking,
typically making their sides’ opening statements and often respond-
ing to offers (presumably, though not necessarily, based on prior
authorizations). In other situations, the lawyers are permitted only
to observe and consult with their clients, but not speak for them.207
                                                                                                                   
that is corrupt at its core,” [Century City, California, attorney Joseph A.]
Yanny charges. “They have taken Lady Justice and put her on the street cor-
ner, hooking for tricks.”
Id. at 54. Of course, repeat players receive favored treatment in traditional litigation
through their relationships with “institutional incumbents,” e.g., judges and court clerks.
Galanter, supra note 30, at 99. Therefore, any such dynamics in mediation would not be
unique or necessarily greater than in traditional litigation.
Conflicts of interest may be prohibited by statute or rule. See, e.g., FLA R. CERT. & CT.-
APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.070(b) (requiring mediators to disclose conflicts of interest). None-
theless, it may not be clear whether disclosure is mandated (or normally provided) in
some situations; thus, prudent mediation shoppers take the initiative to ask about it. See
Harry N. Mazadoorian, Disclosure Questions for ADR Counsel to Ask When Choosing Neu-
trals or Provider Groups, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 95, 95 (1996).
205. For example, in Maine, lawyers usually attend divorce mediation sessions. Sev-
enty-eight percent of lawyers interviewed said that they “almost always” attend mediation
sessions and an additional 17% said that they “usually” did so. See McEwen et al., supra
note 23, at 1359-60. In Florida, official estimates of lawyer attendance vary widely by type
of court and geographical location. For example, in about one-quarter of the mediation
programs in county court mediation (covering cases up to $15,000), lawyers attend in
more than half the cases. In about three-quarters of the programs in family mediation,
lawyers attend in more than half the cases. In about three-quarters of the programs in
circuit civil mediation (cases in which requested damages exceed $15,000), lawyers attend
in more than 80% of the cases. See SCHULTZ ET AL., supra note 2, at 39-40, 89-90, 109. In-
deed, in circuit civil cases, “[i]f a party is represented by counsel, the counsel of record
must appear unless otherwise stipulated to by the parties or otherwise ordered by the
court.” FLA. STAT. § 44.1011(2)(b) (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
206. For example, a lawyer-mediator in Northern California with a large family me-
diation practice reported that she had never attended a mediation on behalf of a client she
represented, and that she is unusual in her mediation community because when she me-
diates, she occasionally suggests that the lawyers attend. See Interview with Althea Lee
Jordan, California attorney and mediator, in Palo Alto, Cal. (Aug. 11, 1996). Data from
205 court-related divorce mediation programs indicated that lawyers did not play a role in
mediation in 43% of the programs, and 33% reported that lawyers could participate by
stipulation of the parties. See McEwen et al., supra note 23, at 1362 n.261 (analyzing data
from a state ADR program database maintained by the National Center for State Courts
(NCSC)). In several states, statutes permit exclusion of lawyers from mediation sessions.
See id. at 1331 & nn.68-69.
207. According to data from the NCSC database as analyzed by McEwen and his col-
leagues, 11% of the court-related divorce mediation programs permitted lawyers to ob-
serve mediation sessions. See McEwen et al., supra note 23, at 1362 n.261. Lawyers in
Maine reported flexibility in their approaches to the balance of their participation and
that of their clients; sometimes the lawyers participate more actively and other times the
clients participate more actively. See id. at 1363-64.
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Some mediators explicitly define their expectations about the
lawyers’ role in the mediators’ opening statement. The lawyers’ role
is often reflected in, and affected by, the seating arrangements. The
individuals seated directly next to the mediators often act as the
primary spokespeople for their side. If the principals sit next to the
mediator, this often signals that the lawyers are expected to act pri-
marily as advisors to their clients rather than as advocates with the
mediator and other side. Some mediators emphasize limitations on
the lawyers’ advisory role by insisting that the lawyers sit behind
their clients rather than sitting at the table. If principals are repre-
sented by counsel but their lawyers do not attend mediation ses-
sions, the lawyers typically review any agreement that is reached in
mediation and may or may not talk with the mediators by phone.
The complicated sets of relationships between mediators, lawyers,
and principals may cause confusion about the nature of the relation-
ships and thus about what behaviors are appropriate. For example,
are the principals primarily the mediators’ clients, primarily the
lawyers’ clients, or both equally? The significance of this issue is il-
lustrated in a simulated mediation of a personal injury case from a
training video featuring a prominent Florida mediator and trainer.208
After the plaintiff’s lawyer completed the opening statement, the
mediator turned to the lawyer and, referring to the plaintiff, asked,
“Would you mind if I ask her a question or two?”209 The question im-
plied that the principal was primarily the lawyer’s—not the media-
tor’s—client and that the mediator could not address the principal
directly without the lawyer’s consent.
Should the mediator normally assume that lawyers accurately
present their clients’ perspectives or should mediators periodically
confirm the principals’ positions themselves? If principals do not ap-
pear comfortable with their lawyers’ statements, would it be an im-
proper interference in the lawyer-client relationship to suggest that
the lawyers confer with their clients or to ask the principals (perhaps
in caucus) to confirm their positions? These quandaries reflect an
ambiguity in the relationships between mediators, lawyers, and
principals. If mediators are more assertive, they risk alienating the
lawyers and perhaps the principals as well. If mediators do not pur-
sue these issues, they clearly reduce the quality of the principals’
consent by failing to examine the issues carefully. Although these
problems can be addressed by mediators, especially by setting expec-
tations in the opening statements,210 they reflect serious potential
                                                                                                                   
208. See Videotape, supra note 199.
209. Id.
210. I am grateful to Craig McEwen for highlighting the fact that mediators have
some control over the role of lawyers in mediation, especially by setting expectations in
the opening statement.
1997]                         LAWYERING AND MEDIATION 885
threats to the authority of both mediators and lawyers. If mediators
assume that lawyers may legitimately use an adversarial approach
to mediation, even a mediator’s questions to a principal may be per-
ceived as inappropriately interfering with the lawyer’s strategy. In
these situations, mediators may feel quite reluctant to probe a prin-
cipal’s thinking in much depth.
Consider further that the question “Would you mind if I ask her a
question or two?” mirrors a typical interaction in litigation in which
one attorney displays respect to an opposing attorney.211 Of course,
rather than being the principal’s adversary, the mediator is supposed
to help the principals. Given the fact that some mediators use strong
directive tactics to pressure principals,212 it may well be necessary and
appropriate for lawyers to protect the principals from the mediator.213
On the other hand, lawyers sometimes look to the mediators to provide
precisely that kind of pressure on the lawyers’ own clients that the
lawyers feel unable or unwilling to effectively exert themselves.214 It is
not uncommon for lawyers to believe that their clients are taking un-
reasonable positions but feel that they (the lawyers) cannot argue too
strongly with their clients without losing the clients’ confidence. In-
deed, McEwen et al. reported that more than half the Maine lawyers
they interviewed spontaneously identified a benefit of mediation as
having mediators “challenge clients to relinquish unrealistic positions
and claims,” thus reinforcing the lawyers’ own advice.215
This discussion shows how the participation of lawyers in media-
tion can complicate and confuse the relationships between lawyers,
mediators, and principals. Given mediators’ dependence on lawyers
as regular sources of future business, it should not be surprising if
mediators especially cater to lawyers’ interests, possibly superseding
the principals’ interests.216 Indeed, mediators and lawyers may find
that they share an interest in pressuring principals to settle, espe-
cially in those liti-mediation cultures where the dominant norm fa-
vors settlement per se as the primary goal of mediation. The follow-
                                                                                                                   
211. In fact, the mediator in the videotape had extensive experience as a litigator.
Thus, the form of the question may be due, in part, to force of habit. I suspect, however,
that this interaction reflected much more than simply an old habit.
212. See supra note 40.
213. McEwen and his colleagues found that virtually all the Maine lawyers they inter-
viewed said that their principal role was to protect their clients from unfairness by the
mediator or the other side. See McEwen et al., supra note 23, at 1360-62.
214. See id. at 1370; see also McEwen et al., supra note 190, at 163-66.
215. McEwen et al., supra note 23, at 1370; see also McEwen et al., supra note 190, at
163-66.
216. Although it may be relatively easy to parry requests from principals for facilita-
tive mediators to be directive by expressing opinions about the merits of a case, I have
heard several mediators express a serious dilemma about how to respond when such re-
quests (or demands) come from attorneys who might be sources of future referrals in a
tight market for mediators. See, e.g., supra note 44.
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ing section considers how lawyers’ participation in mediation may af-
fect timing of litigation and mediation.
B.   Timing in Liti-Mediation
Institutionalization of mediation as a normal step in litigation
may affect the pattern and pace of litigation. Under the mandatory
divorce mediation statute in Maine, mediation has become an ex-
pected settlement event, forcing the lawyers and principals to seri-
ously focus on the issues.217 McEwen and his colleagues found that
the mandated mediation in Maine encouraged the lawyers and prin-
cipals to settle earlier than they otherwise would have.218 Conceiva-
bly, institutionalization of mediation could also delay settlement, de-
pending on local judicial or legal norms about timing of settlement
negotiations. If lawyers expect that they will eventually settle the
cases in mediation, they may hold off conducting direct negotiations
early in litigation.219
There is a split of opinion in the mediation community over the
best time to conduct mediation. Some argue that mediation is most
appropriate early in litigation (or better yet, before litigation), when
principals have not yet hardened their positions and invested a great
deal in litigation expenses.220 Others argue that mediation is not ap-
propriate until late in litigation because principals can make in-
formed decisions only after completing discovery.221 Whatever the lo-
cal norms for the timing of mediation, where it becomes institution-
alized, it is likely to be a (if not the) central settlement event around
which other litigation activities revolve.222
                                                                                                                   
217. See McEwen et al., supra note 23, at 1387.
218. See id. It is not clear how much time mediation saved, considering that the tim-
ing in the litigation varied. In cases that otherwise would have settled “on the courthouse
steps” just before trial, a mediation conducted a week or two before trial resulted in
some—but not substantial—time savings. On the other hand, when mediation occurred
early in the litigation, it presumably resulted in much greater time savings.
219. See McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 6, at 10. In Hennepin County, Minnesota,
where Supreme Court Rule 114 authorizes court referral to mediation,
[t]here may be less lawyer-to-lawyer negotiation going on now, with a pref-
erence to wait for a “mandatory” mediator’s assistance with settlement. . . .
[T]he sheer number of lawyers practicing makes informal, more civil negotia-
tions difficult. Lawyers like the fact that with mediation under Rule 114, an
outside neutral is brought to the case who can assist the lawyers to tone down
their posturing, to be realistic about their cases, and to allow clients to be more
actively involved in the ultimate resolution. In addition, mediation provides a
specific day when all parties come to the table, with the task at hand being to
settle.
Id.
220. See ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 3, § 4:06.
221. See id.
222. One of my students, who is a paralegal with extensive experience working for an
insurance defense firm, describes how her conversations with clients and the lawyers in
her firm often involve planning for their moves in mediation. See Interview with Noël
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The involvement of lawyers in mediation may affect the timing of
the process in several ways, generally adding time pressure to the
mediation process. When lawyers attend mediation, the scheduling
of mediation sessions may be more difficult because it obviously re-
quires coordination of at least two additional schedules. Because
lawyers often have tight schedules, the time available for mediation
may be quite constrained. For example, in the dependency mediation
clinic at my school, it is not unusual for lawyers to arrive late, have
hearings or other appointments scheduled for a time soon after the
mediation is set to begin, and be interrupted during mediation ses-
sions by calls on their pagers and cellular phones.223 Given the pace
of their schedules, they may want to settle cases as fast as possible,
and they often express impatience if the principals, including their
own clients, talk “too much.” If the lawyers do not consider the par-
ties’ relationship concerns224 to be relevant or important, these issues
may not be raised at all or discussed in much depth. When the prin-
cipals are paying their lawyers on an hourly basis (often in addition
to half of the mediator’s fees), the principals may also feel a financial
pressure to avoid dealing with issues that are not legally relevant
and thus “get the mediation over” as quickly as they can.
Given all these time pressures, everyone involved may be reluc-
tant to consider scheduling additional mediation sessions and thus
may try to complete a settlement in a single meeting. When media-
tion takes place shortly before a scheduled trial date, it may be diffi-
cult or impossible to schedule a second session even if all the partici-
pants agree that it would be productive. The regular presence of
lawyers may thus lead to a norm of mediations conducted in a single,
possibly rushed session. Indeed, that is what McEwen and his col-
leagues observed in divorce mediation in Maine, where mediation
usually involves a single mediation session lasting two to three
hours.225 By contrast, Jessica Pearson and Nancy Thoennes found
that in public and private divorce mediation programs that lawyers
did not attend, the mediations involved an average of 3.4 to 6.2 ses-
                                                                                                                   
Miner, graduate student, Nova Southeastern University, in Fort Lauderdale, Fla. (Oct. 3,
1996); see also Edward F. Sherman, The Impact on Litigation Strategy of Integrating Al-
ternative Dispute Resolution into the Pretrial Process, 15 REV. LITIG. 503, 510 (1996)
(“ADR is now a central consideration in pretrial planning.”).
223. See Interview with Sharon Boesl, Director, Clinical and Community Outreach
Center, School of Social and Systemic Studies, Nova Southeastern University, in Fort
Lauderdale, Fla. (Sept. 29, 1996); Interview with Lynne Lucas, Fort Lauderdale mediator,
in Fort Lauderdale, Fla. (Sept. 26, 1996). As Craig McEwen pointed out, norms for timing
are a function of the local culture. Thus, if overscheduling by lawyers was considered un-
acceptable (especially by the judges), this time pressure could be reduced. See McEwen,
supra note 150.
224. See supra notes 175-78 and accompanying text.
225. See McEwen et al., supra note 190, at 154.
888 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:839
sions, totaling an average of 6.3 to 8.7 hours, respectively.226 It is
possible that the difference in the amount of time in mediation is a
function of whether discovery had been completed prior to mediation.
Given the view of many lawyers that mediation is appropriate only
after discovery has been completed, it is possible that mediations
with lawyers attending are more likely to occur with discovery
largely completed. Obviously, if discovery had not been completed
prior to mediation, one would expect that it would take additional
time in mediation to collect and analyze the relevant information.
Nonetheless, the participation of lawyers is likely to add time pres-
sure in mediation for the reasons described above.
In sum, mediation is a central settlement event in liti-mediation
culture. When the lawyers and parties expect that litigation will
normally end in mediation, one can assume that they will plan their
activities in litigation with an eye toward how the case will “play
out” in mediation. Including lawyers in the mediation sessions may
often restrict the time available and the scope of issues considered
appropriate for discussion. Ironically, lawyers’ participation in me-
diation may reduce the quality of the principals’ consent unless me-
diators prepare to handle time pressures that may accompany the
lawyers in mediation.
C.   Use of Adversarial and Problem-Solving Approaches in
Mediation
Regular participation of lawyers in mediation sessions may also
affect the negotiation dynamics in mediation, possibly encouraging
use of positional dynamics of offer and counteroffer rather than a
joint problem-solving effort to seek mutual gains by analyzing the
principals’ underlying interests.227 In a survey of 515 lawyers and
fifty-five judges in New Jersey, Professor Jonathan Hyman and his
colleagues found that, on average, the respondents estimated that
about seventy percent of their cases were settled using positional
methods, even though about sixty percent of the respondents said
that problem-solving methods should be used more often.228 Hyman
                                                                                                                   
226. See Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Divorce Mediation Research Results, in
DIVORCE MEDIATION, supra note 17, at 429, 432.
227. See supra note 49.
228. See JONATHAN M. HYMAN ET AL., CIVIL SETTLEMENT: STYLES OF NEGOTIATION IN
DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1995) at 165. In my survey of 128 business lawyers, 83% said that
in more than half of suits between two businesses, it is appropriate to try to find outcomes
addressing the underlying interests of each party. See Lande, supra note 8 (data on file
with author). Moreover, 60% of the lawyers said that in more than half of suits between
two businesses, outcomes other than or in addition to monetary payments would be ap-
propriate. See id. Thus, at least in theory, the majority of lawyers support the use of
problem-solving approaches in litigated cases. However, interviews with Hennepin
County, Minnesota, lawyers suggest that there are barriers between this philosophy and
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et al. suggest that problem-solving may be used less than lawyers
would like due to fear that opponents will take advantage of them,
perceived opportunities to gain advantage through positional meth-
ods, or simply habitual use of positional tactics.229 Thus, it would not
be surprising if lawyers bring an habitual positional mindset into
mediation,230 especially if the mediator is also a lawyer or retired
judge. Mediators who also have that mindset may feel inhibited
about asking questions to avoid interfering with each side’s
positional strategy, as suggested in Part IV.A.
As Professors David Lax and James Sebenius point out, lawyers’
fears of losing strategic advantage through problem-solving tactics
reflect real risks entailed in such an approach.231 Lax and Sebenius
also show, however, that using a mediator may reduce these risks by
providing a neutral third party who can receive and analyze infor-
mation in confidence.232 Mediation can thus offer a useful forum for
lawyers who want to use a problem-solving approach to negotiation.
Indeed, McEwen et al.’s study suggests that mandatory divorce me-
diation in Maine may have offered just such opportunities and that
most lawyers generally accepted them.233 The researchers found that
lawyers generally adopt a norm of “the reasonable lawyer,” who,
rather than exacerbating conflict, typically tries to reduce it by
“limit[ing] client expectations, resist[ing] identifying emotionally
with the client, avoid[ing] substantially inflated demands, under-
stand[ing] the likely legal outcome, assert[ing] the client’s interests,
respond[ing] to new information, and seek[ing] to reach a divorce
settlement.”234 This finding, though at odds with many popular con-
ceptions of lawyer behavior, is consistent with many other analyses
of lawyers’ settlement orientations, even outside of mediation.235
                                                                                                                   
actual practices, considering that settlements in mediation were not more “creative” than
before mediation became institutionalized. See McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 6, at 10.
229. See HYMAN ET AL., supra note 228, at 166.
230. Leonard Riskin referred to this as a lawyer’s “standard philosophical map.” Leon-
ard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 43-48 (1982); see also Michael
J. Lowy, Law School Socialization and the Perversion of Mediation in the United States, 3
WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS TO JUSTICE 245, 248-52 (1983) (providing an analysis of nine ele-
ments of “legalism” that lawyers may bring into mediation, resulting in the failure to re-
alize the educational potential of mediation). Indeed, mediation practice guides often cau-
tion about the risks of aggressive attorneys obstructing settlement. See, e.g., KIMBERLEE
K. KOVACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 89 (1994).
231. See DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR:
BARGAINING FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAIN 29-45 (1986).
232. See id. at 172-78; see also Robert H. Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An Explora-
tion of Barriers to the Resolution of Conflict, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 235, 248-49
(1993).
233. See McEwen et al., supra note 23, at 1365.
234. Id. at 1365; see also Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through
Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509,
541-46 (1994).
235. See McEwen et al., supra note 23, at 1364-68 and sources cited therein.
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Being “reasonable,” however, is not the same thing as using a prob-
lem-solving approach. Indeed, being “reasonable” may involve law-
yers pressuring their own clients to give up demands and expecta-
tions (perhaps correctly) perceived as unreasonable,236 rather than
searching for options addressing the underlying interests of the
principals. McEwen et al.’s data suggests that Maine lawyers may be
more likely to address the concerns of both principals than lawyers
in New Hampshire, where mediation practice is much less com-
mon.237 When asked about their primary goals in negotiating divorce
cases (not limited to cases in mediation), 39.5% of Maine lawyers re-
ported the goal of reaching “settlements fair to both parties,” com-
pared with 28.3% of New Hampshire lawyers, whereas only 15.8% of
Maine lawyers reported the goal of “getting as much as possible for
[their] client,” compared with 33.3% of New Hampshire lawyers.238
This may indicate that Maine lawyers are more likely to use prob-
lem-solving tactics, especially in mediation. Nonetheless, Hyman et
al.’s data described above239 suggests that we should be cautious
about assuming a tight link between lawyers’ aspirations and actual
problem-solving behavior.240
As we have seen, the participation of lawyers in mediation may
have quite different effects on the use of adversarial and problem-
solving processes in mediation. On one hand, their participation may
contribute to thorough and careful problem solving. On the other
hand, their participation may inhibit such a process by incorporating
traditional adversarial approaches into mediation.
V.   SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In liti-mediation cultures, lawyering and mediation practices may
shape each other in significant ways. Where mediation becomes a
                                                                                                                   
236. See supra text accompanying notes 214-16, 223-25.
237. See McEwen et al., supra note 190, at 178-79.
238. Id.
239. See supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
240. My survey of business lawyers also suggests that there are often loose links be-
tween attitudes and behaviors about desirable dispute resolution procedures. More than
three-quarters (77%) of the business lawyers in the survey said that mediation would be
appropriate in at least half of lawsuits involving a business. See Lande, supra note 8 (data
on file with author). Nonetheless, over the course of their careers, which averaged eight to
ten years, they personally had participated in a median of six to ten cases in which any
ADR procedure was used. See id. For a description of the research design, see id. at 46-84.
Although mediation services may have been less available at the outset of their careers
than at present, this still represents a fairly low usage rate even if all the ADR cases had
occurred in the year or two before the survey was conducted in 1994.
On the other hand, McEwen and his colleagues present data showing an approximate
20% reduction in the number of “adversarial divorce motions per case” coinciding with the
introduction of mandatory divorce mediation in Maine. See McEwen et al., supra note 190,
at 179. This may (or may not) indicate an increase in “reasonableness” or problem-solving
behavior related to increased use of mediation.
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routine part of litigation, the mediation market is likely to be siz-
able, complex, and specialized. Lawyers will recognize their clients’
interests, and thus their own self-interests, in learning the varia-
tions between mediation practices in the relevant mediation mar-
kets. In a liti-mediation environment, lawyers are likely to focus
their settlement efforts on mediation, displacing traditional lawyer-
to-lawyer negotiation to some extent. Over time, they are likely to
identify a set of mediators with whom they have good relationships
and whom they can trust with their clients and favor with business
referrals. Lawyers will learn how to practice advocacy in mediation,
reading the mediators’ moves and then coordinating or parrying as
appropriate.241 Indeed, evidence shows that lawyers quickly come to
appreciate how they can use mediators to manage relationships with
their clients during the awkward process of negotiation. Mediation,
especially where there is a high settlement rate, can add predict-
ability and control to lawyers’ practices.
Lawyers’ routine participation in mediation is also likely to have
a major impact on mediation practice in liti-mediation cultures. Me-
diators will feel pressure to develop distinctive professional identi-
ties with identifiable characteristics of their mediation practices to
maintain and grow their mediation businesses. Mediators will need
to manage relationships with lawyers as repeat buyers of their serv-
ices and professional colleagues who serve the same principals.242
Regular participation of lawyers in mediation is likely to result in
ongoing relationships between mediators and lawyers that may
overshadow their respective relationships with the principals and
dramatically affect the mediation process. Mediators can expect that
lawyers will practice advocacy in mediation and thus mediators will
develop strategies to finesse, reframe, or resist lawyers’ advocacy at
times. Mediators will also learn to recognize when lawyers seek the
mediators’ help by acting as “agents of reality” to reduce or otherwise
reframe principals’ expectations and demands. As this is a recurring
problem for lawyers, mediators are likely to develop regular tactics
for managing these interactions as part of a general definition of the
mediators’ relationships with the principals. Mediators will need to
consider whether they see the lawyers or the principals as their pri-
mary clients.
To the extent that mediators view principals as their primary cli-
ents, mediators will develop tactics to manage their relationships
with lawyers and principals to help the principals assess their goals
                                                                                                                   
241. See generally Lawrence M. Watson, Jr., Effective Legal Representation in Media-
tion, in 2 ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN FLORIDA 2-6 to 2-27 (2d. ed. 1995) (dis-
cussing lawyers’ roles in mediation).
242. Of course, mediators serve all the principals, whereas lawyers serve only one
side.
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and the best way to achieve those goals. Of particular concern are
the principals’ priorities among potentially conflicting mediation
goals, including speedy and efficient resolution, optimal problem-
solving outcomes, enhanced relationships, and principals’ exercise of
responsibility for their decisions. Most mediators probably try to
help principals achieve efficient settlements. Focusing on the princi-
pals’ interests and priorities may lead mediators to consider—and
explicitly discuss with participants—whether the principals have
additional goals and which goals they want to take precedence.
Although lawyers’ participation in mediation may well help their
clients exercise responsibility for their decisions, I suspect that law-
yers’ participation often undermines the principals’ exercise of deci-
sionmaking responsibility. In general, lawyers normally do help
their clients exercise decisionmaking responsibility by identifying
key issues and providing an analysis that enables the principals to
make more informed decisions. On the other hand, lawyers often feel
the need to control their clients’ decisionmaking.243 Moreover, when
lawyers attend mediation, the lawyers’ participation may, possibly
subtly, undermine their clients’ decisionmaking responsibility.244
This is especially likely when lawyers take an active speaking role,
which, by definition, dilutes the role of the principals. In addition,
lawyers’ participation is likely to result in increased time pressure,245
which, in itself may undermine principals’ responsibility taking.
Moreover, time pressure is likely to inhibit the processes that permit
and encourage high-quality consent, including explicit identification
of principals’ goals and interests246 and plausible options,247 princi-
pals’ explicit choice of options for consideration,248 careful analysis of
the options,249 mediators’ restraint from pressuring principals to se-
lect particular options,250 and confirmation of consent.251 These are
certainly not inevitable results of lawyer participation, but I believe
that they are quite likely if mediators do not develop explicit, or at
least conscious, procedures for dealing with it.
Slightly reframing a question that Craig McEwen and his col-
leagues pose, we should consider whether the blending of mediation
                                                                                                                   
243. See McEwen et al., supra note 190, at 163-64.
244. See McEwen et al., supra note 23, at 1327 (summarizing the critique that “legal
advocacy and decision making diminish party autonomy and freedom—and thus
‘empowerment’—by allowing lawyers and courts to shape decisions using legal rules in a
way that may have little relationship to the parties’ priorities, needs, and interests”).
245. See supra text accompanying notes 223-24.
246. See supra Part III.C.1.
247. See supra Part III.C.2.
248. See supra Part III.C.3.
249. See supra Part III.C.4.
250. See supra Part III.C.5.
251. See supra Part III.C.7.
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and the work of lawyers will favorably transform the practices of
both law and mediation, thus justifying McEwen’s call to “bring in
the lawyers,”252 or whether lawyers will co-opt, capture, and legalize
mediation to the detriment of both law and mediation practices.253
My answer is “probably both.”
Relying primarily on the research on mandatory divorce media-
tion in Maine, McEwen et al. argue that
[l]awyer participation in the mediation sessions permits interven-
tion on behalf of clients and buffers pressures to settle. Lawyers
may also counsel clients to moderate extreme demands. In addi-
tion, once lawyers become accustomed to mediation, lawyer in-
volvement in mandated mediation does not appear to prevent the
meaningful participation of parties or inhibit emotional expression
between spouses.254
Not only has lawyer participation stabilized mediation, McEwen and
his colleagues argue, but it may have moderated lawyers’ adversarial
attitudes about negotiation outside of mediation.255
On the other hand, Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow256 and oth-
ers257 worry that institutionalization of mediation in the courts and
the attendant lawyer participation have corrupted mediation with-
out particularly changing lawyers’ adversarial attitudes. She finds
that what is called “mediation” (at least of the court-ordered variety)
is often “just another stop in the ‘litigation’ game which provides an
opportunity for the manipulation of rules, time, information, and ul-
timately, money.”258 Similarly, mediators Nancy Foster and Joan
Kelly express concern about “replicat[ing] the values, norms, as-
sumptions, and procedures of the adversarial divorce process.”259
                                                                                                                   
252. McEwen et al., supra note 23. Note that McEwen and his colleagues specifically
focused on promoting fairness in divorce mediation cases. See id. at 1322. Although their
argument could be applied to most disputes involving significant stakes and potential le-
gal issues, one might make distinctions based on different types of cases, whether there
are significant disparities in power, etc.
253. See McEwen et al., supra note 190, at 176.
254. McEwen et al., supra note 23, at 1394.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 233-38.
256. See generally Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture, su-
pra note 12 (presenting a philosophical defense of settlement in certain situations).
257. See McEwen et al., supra note 23, at 1354-55, 1392 (citing critiques of lawyers as
“spoilers” of “real” mediation).
258. Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture, supra note 12, at
17; see also Lowy, supra note 230, at 252-54.
259. Nancy J. Foster & Joan B. Kelly, Divorce Mediation: Who Should Be Certified?,
30 U.S.F. L. REV. 665, 673 (1996). Foster and Kelly express concern about problems with
lawyers serving as mediators, arguing that, to perform appropriately, lawyer-mediators
may face a difficult challenge to learn new behaviors and change assumptions about their
roles. See id. at 674. Lawyers acting as advocates in mediation may face similar chal-
lenges and may be less likely to receive training or to consider differences between media-
tion and traditional litigation practices.
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As many analysts have noted, mediation practices vary widely,260
so it should not be surprising that in some areas mediation and re-
lated lawyering practices take on the sunny cast that McEwen et al.
depict in Maine, and that in other areas these practices have a
darker (or at best a more mixed) image, as McAdoo and Welsh de-
scribe regarding Hennepin County mediation and Hyman et al. find
in lawyer-to-lawyer negotiation in New Jersey. Even these geo-
graphic distinctions are too crude, as there are probably significant
variations within most practice communities.
Rather than try to determine which portrayal is more accurate, I
believe it makes more sense to frankly acknowledge the reality in all
of these accounts. Indeed, when analyzed carefully, I think these pic-
tures can be integrated fairly easily, yielding a composite of a glass
that is both part empty and part full. McEwen and his colleagues
Professors Lynn Mather, Nancy Rogers, and Richard Maiman have
performed a great service by documenting liti-mediation261 practices
in Maine and identifying important benefits that may accrue from
routinely involving lawyers in mediation practice. McEwen et al.
make a compelling case that Maine-style practices can benefit prin-
cipals, mediators, lawyers, and the legal system more generally. On
the other hand, regular participation of lawyers in liti-mediation
practice can easily spoil important benefits of mediation, especially
the potential for helping principals in disputes retain and responsi-
bly exercise the power to resolve their own problems.262
On balance, I would not support an unqualified call either to
“bring in the lawyers” or to keep them out. Without appropriate pre-
cautions (and perhaps even with them), having lawyers regularly
participate in mediation can predictably lead to the undermining of
important values that mediation can promote, particularly the prin-
cipals’ careful exercise of their responsibility to make decisions about
their disputes. On the other hand, having lawyers participate in me-
diation can provide real benefits and may be the optimal process in
many cases, especially if some or all of the principals would have dif-
ficulty protecting their interests without professional advocates to
speak for them.263
How will lawyering and mediation practices transform each other
in the future? I submit that this will depend on the individual and
collective values, decisions, and commitments of the actors in this
                                                                                                                   
260. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 10, at 228-30; Howard S. Erlanger et al.,
Participation and Flexibility in Informal Processes: Cautions from the Divorce Context, 21
L. & SOC’Y REV. 585, 587 (1987).
261. See supra notes 8, 23 and accompanying text (explaining liti-mediation).
262. See supra notes 214-16, 223-25, 236 and accompanying text.
263. I am grateful to Professor Nancy Rogers for highlighting the importance of attor-
neys in protecting people less able to protect themselves.
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realm. We should expect that this will vary greatly by local culture
and that local culture can, to a significant extent, be consciously de-
veloped.264 I conclude with some recommendations for how various
actors in this collective drama might help bring this about.
VI.   RECOMMENDATIONS
A.   Mediators
I encourage mediators to embrace a great diversity of practices
under the “mediation” label. Mediators of various persuasions (e.g.,
differently valuing promotion of settlement and empowerment) have
good reasons to hold their values, and also have legitimate concerns
about the implications of other philosophies. There is some merit to
most mediation philosophies, and we should resist the temptation
(which I confess to succumb to at times) to elevate our own approach
as “real” mediation and denigrate others as false substitutes that
should not share the mediation franchise. Though disparaging other
approaches may feel satisfying in the moment, I am convinced that it
is a counterproductive long-term strategy. It is unlikely that any
camp will prevail completely, and if perchance one does, mediators,
and, more importantly, principals, will lose the precious values of di-
versity and choice.
Instead, it would be much more helpful for adherents of differing
mediation philosophies in local mediation communities to respect-
fully work together to concretely classify their differences as an aid
to mediation consumers.265 Various methods exist for mediators to do
this. One method is to observe and then discuss each others’ work.266
Another is to participate in peer consultation groups to discuss me-
diation cases, styles, and techniques.267 A third method is to operate
a speaker’s bureau or other public education program. I participated
                                                                                                                   
264. See Swidler, supra note 62, at 279-80; Lande, supra note 8, at 224-31.
265. See supra Parts II.A-B for one attempt to define market differences.
266. Local norms for observing mediation vary widely. For example, a California me-
diator with a busy practice told me that she had never had anyone observe her work and
would be very concerned about clients’ reactions to having observers in her mediation ses-
sions. This was typical of my mediation community when I was in practice in California.
In Florida, where observation is mandated as part of the process for becoming certified,
see FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.010(a)(2), (b)(3), (c)(3), having observers is
so routine that mediators often simply introduce the observers without seriously inquiring
if the participants have any concerns about their presence. Even so, experienced Florida
mediators may never see any other mediators’ work after becoming certified. At the 1995
annual training session of the Florida Academy of Professional Mediators, one Florida
mediator who had done over 1000 mediations realized, after watching someone else do a
mediation demonstration, that he had never seen anyone else do mediation since becom-
ing certified and that he was not aware of many differences in styles. Mediators in a given
community could create a norm, legitimizing particular observation procedures.
267. See Edward Blumstein & Patricia B. Wisch, Who Nurtures the Nurturer? A Model
of a Peer Support Group, 9 MEDIATION Q. 267 (1992).
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in such a group, which developed a training program for speakers
and a directory of local mediators. Our discussions regarding how to
present mediation to our community helped us identify relevant dis-
tinctions between mediation services.268 Given the critical role that
lawyers play in liti-mediation culture—especially as mediation
shoppers—it would be especially important to develop materials ad-
dressing lawyers’ particular interests in mediation as well as media-
tors’ concerns about lawyer participation in mediation. When attor-
neys attend mediations, mediators should consider discussing at the
outset how the principals would like the attorneys to participate.
Those especially interested in promoting disputants’ responsibility
for making dispute resolution decisions should find a public educa-
tion strategy to be particularly appealing.
I encourage mediators primarily committed to an empowerment
philosophy to appreciate the values of settlement and efficiency in
mediation, especially for principals making informed choices and
selecting mediators with those orientations. If mediators provide
reasonable disclosure to principals about their procedures and gain
the principals’ consent to use those procedures,269 then these are le-
gitimate choices that should be respected. By the same token, I en-
courage settlement-oriented mediators to appreciate that principals
may have goals that they value as much or more than settlement it-
self. Rather than assuming that settlement is the only or primary
goal, I encourage these mediators to assess and respect the princi-
pals’ goals and priorities, recognizing that the principals’ perspec-
tives may well be somewhat different than those of their lawyers.
Settlors should consider using at least some of the practices pro-
moting high-quality consent,270 even if they do not adopt all of them.
I would hope that all mediators become more aware of their own me-
diation styles and philosophies and describe them clearly, both in
the shopping process and the mediation process itself.
B.   Lawyers
To serve their clients’ interests, and thus serve their own inter-
ests, lawyers should become familiar with the various styles of me-
diation practice in their local culture so they can competently advise
clients about use of mediation, select mediators appropriate for par-
ticular cases, and constructively participate in mediation as appro-
priate. Given that mediation offers the special opportunity for a
                                                                                                                   
268. See John Lande, Speaking for Mediation, MEDIATION Q., Fall 1987, at 23, 28.
269. See Mazadoorian, supra note 204 (identifying questions ADR buyers might ask
ADR providers); Aaron, supra note 173, at 63 (advising mediators to ask permission before
offering evaluations).
270. See supra Part III.C.
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problem-solving approach to negotiation, which many lawyers
value,271 lawyers should use their role as mediation shoppers to espe-
cially assess whether a problem-solving approach would be appro-
priate in particular cases and whether particular mediators would
use it. Lawyers should also be sensitive to the impact of their par-
ticipation and how it may affect (and sometimes impair) the quality
of mediation offered and their clients’ opportunities to assume re-
sponsibility for their decisions. Thus, lawyers should not simply as-
sume that their clients need or want the lawyers to act as the pri-
mary advocates in mediation and should discuss with their clients
the range of possible roles that the lawyer might take.
C.   Law Schools
As liti-mediation becomes more common, law schools should pre-
pare their students to advise and represent clients regarding media-
tion as described in the preceding subpart. Indeed, law schools have
been making progress in adding courses on mediation and ADR to
their curricula. Very few ADR course offerings existed a decade
ago.272 Today, most law schools provide some ADR courses, although
these are often electives available only to a small fraction of the stu-
dents. Although some schools, like the University of Missouri-
Columbia,273 integrate ADR material into all the required first-year
courses, this is beyond what most law schools are likely to do in the
near future. At a minimum, however, all law schools should include
some coverage of ADR in required courses like civil procedure and
ethical lawyering/professional responsibility. Given the widespread
use of mediation in family cases, mediation should be covered in
family law courses as well. While law professors should certainly be
free to expound their own philosophies of mediation in courses
                                                                                                                   
271. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
272. See Lande, supra note 8 (data on file with author). My survey of business lawyers
asked how much information about ADR they had gotten from a number of sources, in-
cluding their graduate or professional schools. On average, the lawyers in the sample had
graduated from law school in the mid-1980s. Seventy-four percent said that they received
“no information” about ADR from school, eighteen percent said “a little information,” and
eight percent said “more than a little information.” See id.
273. See RONALD M. PIPKIN, FINAL REPORT TO THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-COLUMBIA
SCHOOL OF LAW: PROJECT ON INTEGRATING DISPUTE RESOLUTION INTO STANDARD FIRST
YEAR COURSES: AN EVALUATION (1993). Since 1985, the University of Missouri-Columbia
School of Law has integrated ADR material into all first-year courses. See id. In 1995, six
additional law schools began adapting this model in their curricula under a $180,000
grant from the U.S. Department of Education’s Fund for the Improvement of Post-
Secondary Education. These schools are at DePaul University, Hamline University, Inter
American University, Ohio State University, Tulane University, and the University of
Washington. See Press Release from University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law (Nov.
2, 1995) (announcing expansion of dispute resolution teaching program) (on file with
author).
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teaching mediation skills, as a pluralist,274 I would hope that they
would identify and legitimize a variety of styles and philosophies of
mediation, discussing the benefits and problems of each. I would also
hope that they would specifically address questions about the effects
of lawyer participation in mediation and strategies that mediators
might use to work constructively with lawyers on behalf of their joint
clients.
D.   Judges, Court Administrators, and Legislators 275
Officials responsible for making and implementing mediation
policy should act based on an appreciation of both the reach and
limits of legal authority. On one hand, courts’ authority to decide
cases gives them great influence, even in formally nonbinding sug-
gestions. Thus, a judge’s comment or a policy merely encouraging the
use of mediation may be widely interpreted as a directive that may
result in formal or informal sanctions if the “suggestion” is not fol-
lowed.276 If officials do not intend such statements to be interpreted
as being mandatory or carrying even informal sanctions, they must
say so clearly. In addition, officials dealing with court policy and
administration are often understandably concerned about keeping
court dockets moving by regularly settling a steady stream of
cases.277 While this is certainly a legitimate goal, it is often in tension
with other goals of dispute resolution.278 Of particular concern here is
the potentially adverse impact of time and other settlement pres-
sures on the disputants’ exercise of their decisionmaking responsi-
bilities.279 Unless officials make a conscious and careful effort to pro-
tect against inappropriate pressures,280 such pressures may well be-
come a regular part of the legal culture.
Although judges and other public officials dealing with dispute
resolution have great authority, they are often in a difficult position
                                                                                                                   
274. See supra notes 65, 71-73 and accompanying text.
275. It is well beyond the scope of this Article to offer general recommendations about
the overall goals and design of court mediation programs. For an excellent analysis of
such issues, see ELIZABETH PLAPINGER & MARGARET SHAW, COURT ADR: ELEMENTS OF
PROGRAM DESIGN (1992). The discussion here is limited to suggestions related to issues
addressed in the body of this Article.
276. See McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 6, at 10; see also supra note 107 and accompa-
nying text.
277. See Kovach & Love, supra note 9, at 31.
278. See supra notes 46-60 and accompanying text (discussing various goals of media-
tion.
279. See generally supra Part IV.
280. See generally SOCIETY OF PROF’LS IN DISP RESOL., MANDATED PARTICIPATION AND
SETTLEMENT COERCION: DISPUTE RESOLUTION AS IT RELATES TO THE COURTS (1991) (rec-
ommending caution in mandating participation in mediation programs); ROGERS &
MCEWEN, supra note 3, at chs. 7, 13 (arguing that judges should be prohibited from using
economic and time pressures in connection with mediation to increase settlement rates).
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to manage these processes because the regulatory tools generally
used are blunt instruments and their policy directives often do not
fully “penetrate” into daily practice.281 As McEwen et al. persuasively
argue, many regulations intended to protect against unfairness in
mediation are ill-defined, vague, contradictory, difficult to imple-
ment, and unlikely to be effective, but likely to increase costs.282 In-
deed, there is a risk that such regulation will actually cause harm by
lulling public officials and/or the general public into a false sense of
security.283 Under these circumstances, I have no general prescrip-
tion for officials other than to be cautious and not assume that offi-
cial policies will be simply and directly implemented as intended.284
As we have seen with official “suggestions” to consider or use media-
tion, informal pressures may be quite powerful and sometimes over-
ride official policies. Indeed, various nonregulatory approaches may
be more effective in assuring quality and achieving social goals.285
Thus, I see regulation as only one—and not necessarily the most im-
portant—component of a comprehensive approach to promote posi-
tive values in mediation.
E.   Researchers
This Article suggests a narrow agenda for empirical research as
well as a broad one. Starting with the narrower agenda, in Part II of
this Article, I identified some distinctions that practitioners and
analysts have used to differentiate mediators. Are these distinctions,
or perhaps other “native concepts,” actually used in the mediation
market? In Part III, I outlined a set of behavioral factors describing
the quality of consent in mediation. Are these (or other factors) valid
indicators? How can these factors be measured concretely? In Part
IV, I hypothesized about possible changes that might occur in law-
yering and mediation practices as part of the development of liti-
                                                                                                                   
281. See Galanter, supra note 30, at 103.
282. See McEwen et al., supra note 23, at 1330-49. I share McEwen et al.’s skepticism
about the efficacy of legal regulation to protect principals in mediation and safeguard
larger social values of disputing. See Lande, supra note 74, at 44; Lande, supra note 268,
at 28-30.
283. See McEwen et al., supra note 23, at 1335 (“[T]he primary virtue of legislating
such mediator duties is to instill optimism in the rule-maker or legislator.”); cf. Susan S.
Silbey, Mediation Mythology, 9 NEGOTIATION J. 349, 350 (1993) (suggesting that guide-
lines for selecting mediators perpetuate myth of informal, innovative, neutral, and nonau-
thoritative process and create “false expectations [that] disappoint users and practitioners
of mediation alike”).
284. For example, while I endorse the notion that “[n]egotiations in family mediation
are primarily conducted by the parties,” FLA. STAT. § 44.1011(2)(d) (Supp. 1996), and I
even think that it is useful to include this statement in statutory language, we should not
expect that this alone will make it so.
285. See Lande, supra note 74, at 44; Lande, supra note 268, at 28-30.
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mediation culture. Which, if any, of these changes are actually occur-
ring and why?
More broadly, the contemporary co-evolution of lawyering and
mediation practices provides a wonderful opportunity to study the
development of professional cultures and markets.286 We are now in
a period when definitions of legitimate practice are coalescing, albeit
in varying configurations in different local areas. It would be fasci-
nating to analyze the forces leading to the development of particular
local disputing cultures. One possibility is that general indigenous
norms (i.e., norms not specifically relating to dispute resolution pro-
cedures) affect the evolution of norms about dispute resolution. If so,
the development of mediation practice (or the predominance of a par-
ticular style of mediation) in a community may be a function of more
general attitudes about human relationships in that community.
Thus, we might hypothesize that liti-mediation culture may be more
likely to be adopted in communities where residents have more coop-
erative relationships than communities with more adversarial rela-
tionships. Similarly, liti-mediation culture may be more likely to
grow in more interconnected communities. Alternatively, there may
be an inverse relationship  such that mediation may especially take
hold in those communities where indigenous social connections are
especially frayed or lacking.
Is the development of a local disputing culture a function of the
availability and perceived quality of indigenous alternatives for
handling disputes? For example, is the growth of formal mediation a
result of dissatisfaction with existing informal dispute processes? Or
problems with the local courts? Or reactions to initial experiments
with mediation?
Are there particular types of individuals and institutions that play
key roles in the evolution of local disputing cultures? The obvious sus-
pects include lawyers, judges, mediators, public officials, and other
professionals and community leaders. Perhaps less obvious may be the
activity of intellectual and organizational entrepreneurs who provide
the conceptual and material structures needed to sustain a culture.
To what extent is the development of local disputing culture a re-
sult of historical coincidence of several (or certain) of these factors at
the same time or the fact that significant events have (or have not)
previously occurred?
The better we can answer these questions, the better we will be
able to anticipate and shape the future of mediation. If the spread of
                                                                                                                   
286. Andrew Abbott argues that the jurisdictional boundaries limiting the professional
activities of particular professions often shift over time in relation to the activities of
“neighboring” professions. See ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY
ON THE DIVISION OF EXPERT LABOR 33-113 (1988).
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liti-mediation cultures continues, we can expect that both lawyering
and mediation practices will be profoundly affected. Although some
of the changes would presumably be beyond our control, this Article
suggests ways that various actors can help define and improve the
range of disputing practices in their local communities.287
                                                                                                                   
287. The ideas regarding the broader research agenda grew, in part, from my disserta-
tion research. I am grateful to my committee, especially the chair, Mark Suchman, for
nourishing these ideas. I also want to thank the participants at a faculty seminar of the
Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School in May 1995, who contributed some of
these ideas.
